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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Computer networks are one of the great engineering contributions of the past century.
If the 19th century was the era of the Pax Brittanica and global trade, then the 20th will
almost certainly be remembered as the century of global communication, thanks in large
part to the incredible global network we call the Internet. The Internet has grown at a
breath-taking rate: at the time of the author’s birth, in 1987, the Internet was little more
than a novelty, used only by computer science academics, military research organizations,
and handful of bleeding-edge enthusiasts. By the time of this thesis, 30 years later, the
Internet is at the core of the modern economy. It is diﬃcult to overstate the importance of
computer networks to modern life: every Fortune 500 company relies upon the Internet for
its daily operations, if not for its raison d’etre, and the U.N. has even recommended that
“ensuring universal access to the Internet should be a priority for all States” [88].
As computer networks have grown in importance, so too have our demands upon them.
Modern computer networks provide an array of functionality, far beyond the original goal
of providing a communication channel between remote systems. A sample of features the
author experienced in a single day while writing this thesis included:
 A captive portal that prevents coﬀeeshop users from accessing the Internet until they’ve
accepted the terms of use
 “Wi-fi oﬄoad”, which transparently moves mobile subscribers from cellular data to wi-fi
networks
 Network traﬃc acceleration for high-latency satellite Internet connections1
1Satellite Internet is predominantly provided by satellites in geostationary orbit. Because of the large
distance that radio signals have to travel to reach the satellite and return to Earth, and the speed-of-light,
1
 Traﬃc isolation to prevent users of the same local network from accessing each other’s
machines
With all of this functionality comes corresponding complexity. Our network devices have
a dizzying array of configuration options, and understanding the behavior of a full network
config file is not for the faint of heart. More than ever, we need tools that can automatically
analyze configurations and determine whether or not the resulting network will have a desired
correctness property.
Formally reasoning about network configurations requires building models that relate
those configurations to the resulting network behaviors. However, the configuration “lan-
guages” that network vendors provide not only lack a formal semantics (specification of
meaning), they often lack even a detailed informal description of the intended behavior. As
a result, the only model of a configuration language that we can rely upon is the actual
implementation, often a large, highly complex piece of closed source code numbering in the
millions of lines.
As a result, existing verification tools for networks have followed one of three approaches.
Post hoc verification tools such as VeriFlow [52] or NetPlumber [48] check properties of
the current network state, avoiding modeling configurations altogether, but therefore cannot
predict how the behavior of the system will change as the configuration changes (e.g. will a
new configuration preserve connectivity?). Static configuration analyzers such as rcc [20] can
detect generic configuration errors, but cannot establish correctness of a configuration with
respect to a specification of correctness (e.g. does the configuration allow only traﬃc from
trusted hosts to reach the server?).2 Finally, verifiers such as Propane[8] identify specific
unaccelerated browsing can take more than two seconds to even begin loading a web page in the best of
circumstances.
2One analogy would be the diﬀerence between an automated spelling and grammar checker in a word
2
subsets of well-defined functionality amenable to formal analysis (e.g. analyzing whether
network routers will prefer to listen to the routes advertised by one neighbor over another).
This thesis takes a diﬀerent strategy: rather than try to apply formal modeling after the
fact to systems which were not designed for reasoning or correctness (and have repeatedly
defied such attempts), we start from a clean-slate approach where network devices support
only core network functionality (matching, modifying, and forwarding packets), and show
how we can build networks that are designed from the ground-up to support formal reasoning
and verification. Instead of being configured, these networks are programmed. This allows
us to apply programming languages techniques for building and verifying systems. We start
with a network programming language with well-defined formal semantics, and show how to
use the semantics to build an automated tool that can prove whether or not a given program
correctly implements a specification. We then build a formal model of software-defined
networks, and show how to use this model to build formally verified compilers and run times
that provably convert the original network program into equivalent network states. Finally,
we show how to update the network policy in such a way that reasoning and verification
performed on the old and new policies is preserved by the network while transitioning.
Network updates are a common source of network errors and being able to reason about the
behavior of a network under update is essential to a verified system.
Contributions Verification starts with a specification of correctness. In Chapter 3, we
present an expressive, well-defined language for specifying the correct forwarding behavior of
networks, precisely and formally describe what it means for a network program (a declarative
specification of a specific forwarding configuration) to satisfy its specification, and show how
to build a verifier that automatically proves the correctness (or incorrectness) of a program
processor, and a peer reviewer. The former is capable of telling you whether your paper has writing mistakes,
but the latter can tell you whether or not your paper accomplishes what it set out to do.
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with respect to a given specification.
Verifying a network program has only limited utility if a correct program is translated
and implemented incorrectly by a compiler or runtime. Indeed, several works have found
correctness bugs in compilers and network controllers that would counter-act the benefits of
verification (see e.g. [14] [35]). In Chapter 4, we show how to build a formally verified com-
piler and runtime for network programs that provably preserves the correctness of the input
program. We also build a formal model of OpenFlow [70], the most popular SDN protocol,
and describe a generic proof technique that can be adapted to verify future implementations.
The techniques described in Chapters 3 and 4 only apply to a single network program,
but real network forwarding policies change over time, in response to changes in the network
topology, traﬃc loads, application demands, etc.. In Chapter 5 we show how to update a
network from one forwarding policy to another in such a way that verification performed on
the original and final configurations is preserved by the network in the transition.
Each of these developments is demonstrated by a real system that has been implemented
and publicly released under an open-source license. Each system is also accompanied by a
formal model or semantics that precisely and clearly models its behavior. In addition, all of
the theorems and code described in Chapter 4, and most of the theorems in Chapter 5 have
been formally verified in the Coq proof assistant.
4
CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
2.1 Historical context
Right now, in 2015, we are at the beginning of a large-scale revolution in the world of
networking. For more than 30 years, there has been little fundamental change in the way
that we design, build, and maintain networks. If you transported a network administrator
from 1985 forward to today, they would recognize the fundamental principles of network
design from their own day, even if the names, protocols, and other details have changed. At
the same time, the kinds of applications and sheer scale of networks has changed in ways
that we could have never dreamt of before the explosion of the internet and internet services.
This traditional networking style was based on a distributed architecture of expensive
hardware boxes (called routers or switches, depending upon increasingly irrelevant protocol
distinctions) that coordinated and configured themselves through a myriad of distributed
protocols. For the purpose of this thesis, the important thing to understand is that every
aspect of these networks, from the physical hardware to the software running on them, to
the protocols they use to coordinate, was built and controlled wholly by network vendors,
not the network owners.
Over the decades, there have been many proposals for new network architectures that
solve the problems of traditional networking, and have the flexibility to adapt to new ap-
plications and demands. One of the best known proposals, Active Networks [97], turned
packets into programs by embedding a full Turing-complete language into packet headers.
Switches were transformed into interpreters, and control over forwarding and other network
functions was delegated completely to end-hosts.
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2.2 Software-defined Networking
More recently, Software-defined Networking (henceforth “SDN”) has arisen as a serious chal-
lenger to the status quo. SDN decouples the packet-processing functions of the data plane
from the control plane through a logically centralized-controller1 that manages the network
directly by configuring the packet-handling mechanisms in the underlying switches. The key
elements of the design are that the switch configuration protocol is open and standardized,
and the essential network management software runs on a commodity server programmed
by the network owner. This allows the development of reusable implementations of generic
network functions and makes the network almost completely customizable.
SDN has already seen adoption far beyond what Active Networks or any other competing
proposal ever saw. Some of the largest technology companies in the world (Google, Microsoft,
Facebook, VMware, and more) have either already adopted it, or are developing products
around it.
OpenFlow In this thesis, we will use the OpenFlow SDN protocol to implement our net-
work programs.
In an OpenFlow network, switches connect to a central controller, which then directly
configures their forwarding behavior by programming a flow table. A flow table is a list of
match-action rules, consisting of a match pattern that describes packet headers, and a list
1The controller is centralized is the sense that a single architectural component controls a function,
as opposed to being decentralized in which many components control their own functions independently.
Physically, the controller may be implemented as many co-ordinating distributed controllers.
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of action rules that dictate how to process matching packet. An example is
Priority Pattern Action
2 fdlDst = H1g fj10jg
1 ? fjjg
This flow table has two entries: the first one matches packets whose destination mac ad-
dress (dlDst) is H1, and forwards them out port 10. The second rule matches all packets and
forwards them on no ports, which drops them. The rules have priorities that disambiguate
overlapping rules. Because the first rule has a higher priority, it applies before the second
one. Therefore, this flow table forwards packets destined for mac address H1 out port 10,
and drops all other packets. In the rest of this thesis, we will omit priorities when possible.
Rules will be listed in priority order, with high priority to low priority, top to bottom. Note
that the action field of a rule is a multiset: if the same port is repeated, then a packet is
duplicated and forwarded out the same port multiple times. In addition to forwarding, the
action field can modify the value of packet header fields, or send the packet to the controller.
The controller programs flow tables by sending sequences of messages to install rules on
the switch. To install the first rule in the above flow table, the controller would send:
Add 2 fdlDst = H2g fj10jg
Network programming languages The interfaces exposed by SDN protocols, in par-
ticular OpenFlow, are quite low-level, the networking equivalent of assembly. Recent work
has proposed a number of high-level languages and language abstractions to simplify the
task of developing correct, reliable SDN systems. See [15] and [23] for a survey of current
developments in network programming languages.
In this thesis, we focus upon two programming languages in the Frenetic family: NetKAT
7
[4] and its predecessor NetCore [74]. NetKAT is introduced in this chapter, and NetCore is
described before it is used in Chapter 4.
2.3 The NetKAT Programming Language
The network programming language NetKAT was developed by Anderson et al. [4]. NetKAT
is an extension of Kleene algebra with tests (KAT), an algebraic system for program ver-
ification that combines Kleene Algebra (KA) with boolean algebra [57]. NetKAT oﬀers a
collection of intuitive constructs including: predicates over packets; primitives for modifying
packet headers and encoding topologies; iterations; and sequential and parallel composition
operators. The semantics is given in terms of a denotational model based on functions from
packet histories to sets of packet histories (where a history records a packet’s path through
the network). In addition to the denotational semantics, NetKAT has a sound and complete
equational deductive system.
2.3.1 Syntax
NetKAT [4] is based upon Kleene algebra with tests (kat) [57], a generic equational system
for reasoning about partial correctness of programs.
Kleene Algebra (KA) & Kleene Algebra with Tests (KAT) A Kleene algebra (ka)
is an algebraic structure,
(K; +; ; ?; 0; 1)
where K is an idempotent semiring under (+; ; 0; 1), and p  q is the least solution of the
inequality p  r + q  r, where p  q is shorthand for p + q = q, and similarly for q  p. A
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Naturals n 2 0 j 1 j 2 j : : :
Fields x ::= x1 j    j xk
Packets pk ::= ff1 = n1;    ; fk = nkg
Histories  ::= hpki j pk :
Tests a ::= 1 True
j 0 False
j x = n Header test
j a1 + a2 Disjunction
j a1  a2 Conjunction
j :a Negation
Actions p ::= a Test
j x n Modification
j p1 + p2 Parallel Composition
j p1  p2 Sequential Composition
j p Iteration
j dup Duplication
Figure 2.1: NetKAT Syntax.
Kleene algebra with tests (kat) is an algebraic structure,
(K; B; +; ; ?; 0; 1; :)
where : is a unary operator defined only on B, such that
 (K; +; ; ?; 0; 1) is a Kleene algebra,
 (B; +; ; : ; 0; 1) is a Boolean algebra, and
 (B; +; ; 0; 1) is a subalgebra of (K; +; ; 0; 1).
The elements of B and K are called tests and actions.
The axioms of ka and kat (both elided here) capture natural conditions such as asso-
ciativity of  ; see the original paper by Kozen for a complete listing [57].
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NetKAT NetKAT [4] extends kat with network-specific primitives for filtering, modify-
ing, and forwarding packets, along with additional axioms for reasoning about programs
built using those primitives. Formally, NetKAT is kat with atomic actions and tests
x n x = n dup
with the following meanings: The test x = n tests whether field x of the current packet
contains the value n; the assignment x n assigns the value n to the field x in the current
packet; and the action dup duplicates the last packet in the packet history, which keeps track
of the path the packet takes through the network.
For example, the NetKAT expression
pt = 5  sw = 3  dst  192:168:1:5  pt  5
encodes the command: “For all packets located at port 5 of switch 3, set the destination
address to 192:168:1:5 and forward it out on port 5.”
2.3.2 Semantics
The standard semantics of NetKAT interprets expressions as packet-processing functions.
As defined in Figure 2.1, a packet  is a record whose fields assign constant values n to fields
x and a packet history is a nonempty sequence of packets 1 :2 :    :k, listed in order of
youngest to oldest. Operationally, only the head packet 1 exists in the network, but we
keep track of the packet’s history in the semantics to enable precise reasoning about behavior
involving forwarding along diﬀerent paths.
Formally, a NetKAT term p denotes a function
JpK : H ! 2H;
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where H is the set of all packet histories. Intuitively, the function JpK takes an input packet
history  and produces a set of output packet histories JpK(), representing all of the packets
that result from the forwarding function, and their associated histories.
The semantics of the primitive actions and tests in NetKAT are as follows. For a packet
history  : with head packet ,
Jx nK( :) = f[n=x] :g
Jx = nK( :) =
8>><>>:
f :g; (x) = n
;; (x) 6= n
JdupK( :) = f : :g
J1K() = fg
J0K() = ;:
where [n=x] denotes the packet  with the field x rebound to the value n. A test x = n
filters out (drops) the packet if the test is not satisfied and passes it through if it is. The
dup construct duplicates the head packet , yielding a fresh copy that can be modified by
other constructs. Hence, in this standard model, the dup construct can be used to encode
paths through the network, with each occurrence of dup marking an intermediate hop.
The operations (+, , , :) are interpreted as follows:
Jp+ qK() = JpK() [ JqK()
Jp  qK() = [
2JpK()JqK()
JpK() =[
n
JpnK()
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J:aK() =
8>><>>:
fg; if JaK() = ;
;; if JaK() = fg
Note that + behaves like disjunction when applied to tests and like union when applied
to actions. Similarly,  behaves like conjunction when applied to tests and like sequential
composition when applied to actions. Negation is only ever applied to tests, as is enforced
by the syntax of the language.
2.3.3 Equational Theory
NetKAT has a sound and complete equational theory, based upon the equational theory
of kat. This means that two NetKAT terms are semantically equivalent (denote the same
function) iﬀ there is a proof of equivalence using the NetKAT axioms.
The NetKAT axioms, shown in Fig. 2.2, consist of the axioms for Kleene Algebra (start-
ing with ka-*), the axioms for a Boolean Algebra (starting with ba-*), and NetKAT-specific
Packet Algebra axioms (starting with pa-*) describing the interaction between packet mod-
ifications and packet tests.
The Packet Algebra axioms say that modifications or filters on disparate fields com-
mute (pa-mod-mod-comm and pa-mod-filter-comm); filters commute with dup (pa-
dup-filter-comm); modifying a packet field to a specific value and then testing for that
same value is the same as only performing the modification, and vice versa (pa-mod-filter
and pa-filter-mod); when modifying the same field twice, the second modification “wins”
(pa-mod-mod); testing the same field for diﬀerent values is always false (pa-contra); and
that the disjunction of all possible tests for a single field is always satisfied (pa-match-all).
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2.3.4 Language Model
We stated that the above axioms are sound and complete for NetKAT. Soundness is easy
enough to show using the semantics, but proving completeness requires diﬀerent tools. Fol-
lowing the standard approach, Anderson et al. [4] develop a language model, a semantics
in which terms are interpreted as sets of “strings” (formally, elements in a monoid). For
NetKAT, these are “reduced” strings of the form
p0dup1dup2    n 1dupn; n  0;
where  is a complete test x1 = n1: : :xk = nk, i is a complete assignment x1  n1: : :xk  
nk , and each of the fields is xk for exactly one k. We will write At for the set of complete
tests, and P for the set of complete assignments. The set of reduced strings is AtP (dupP ),
where dup is the singleton set containing dup; A  B denotes string concatenation (lifted to
sets of strings)2; and A denotes [iAi, where Ai+1 , A  Ai and A0 , fg for  the empty
string.
Every NetKAT expression is equivalent to a reduced expression in which every test is a
complete test and every assignment is a complete assignment. The complete tests are the
atoms (minimal nonzero elements) of the Boolean algebra generated by the primitive tests.
Complete tests and complete assignments are in one-to-one correspondence.
The full language model for NetKAT is defined over the reduced expressions and is shown
in Fig. 2.3. The language denoted by a complete test  is the singleton set containing the
reduced string  , where  is the complete assignment corresponding to . The language
denoted by a complete assignment is the set of reduced string    for every complete test
2Note: string concatenation is diﬀerent from the guarded concatenation used in the language model. See
Fig. 2.3 for guarded concatenation
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. The language of p + q is the union of the languages of p and q; the language of a
sequential composition is the guarded concatenation of the languages; and the language of
p is the union of all finite iterates of the language of pn. The semantics of dup requires some
explanation: dup is supposed to make a head copy of the head packet. Thus, it takes the
head packet , and copies it across the place-holder dup as .
See the original paper on NetKAT [4] for a comprehensive treatment of the language
model, including proofs of the claims above.
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Kleene Algebra Axioms
p+ (q + r)  (p+ q) + r ka-plus-assoc
p+ q  q + p ka-plus-comm
p+ 0  p ka-plus-zero
p+ p  p ka-plus-idem
p  (q  r)  (p  q)  r ka-seq-assoc
1  p  p ka-one-seq
p  1  p ka-seq-one
p  (q + r)  p  q + p  r ka-seq-dist-l
(p+ q)  r  p  r + q  r ka-seq-dist-r
0  p  0 ka-zero-seq
p  0  0 ka-seq-zero
1+ p  p  p ka-unroll-l
q + p  r  r =) p  q  r ka-lfp-l
1+ p  p  p ka-unroll-r
p+ q  r  q =) p  r  q ka-lfp-r
Additional Boolean Algebra Axioms
a+ (b  c)  (a+ b)  (a+ c) ba-plus-dist
a+ 1  1 ba-plus-one
a+ :a  1 ba-excl-mid
a  b  b  a ba-seq-comm
a  :a  0 ba-contra
a  a  a ba-seq-idem
Packet Algebra Axioms
f  n  f 0  n0  f 0  n0  f  n; if f 6= f 0 pa-mod-mod-comm
f  n  f 0 = n0  f 0 = n0  f  n; if f 6= f 0 pa-mod-filter-comm
dup  f = n  f = n  dup pa-dup-filter-comm
f  n  f = n  f  n pa-mod-filter
f = n  f  n  f = n pa-filter-mod
f  n  f  n0  f  n0 pa-mod-mod
f = n  f = n0  0; if n 6= n0 pa-contraP
i
f = i  1 pa-match-all
Figure 2.2: NetKAT axioms
Language model: G(p)  At  P  (dup  P )
G() = f  g
G() = f   j  2 Atg
G(p+ q) = G(p) [G(q)
G(p  q) = G(p) G(q)
G(dup) = f    dup   j  2 Atg
G(p) =
S
n0G(p
n)
Guarded concatenation
  p      q  0 =
(
  p  q  0 if  = 
undefined if  6= 
A B = fpq j p 2 A; q 2 Bg
Figure 2.3: NetKAT language model
CHAPTER 3
VERIFYING NETWORK PROGRAMS
“Seek simplicity and distrust it.”
—Alfred North Whitehead
In this chapter, we introduce a novel specification language for network forwarding prop-
erties (Pathetic), and show how to build a formal verification tool that automatically analyzes
NetKAT policies for correctness with respect to a Pathetic specification.
3.1 Introduction
Network configurations have long been a source of serious bugs and misbehavior in real-
world networks. Written in arcane, poorly specified (often unspecified) languages, they
defied meaningful verification. Before the development of a static configuration analyzer (the
router configuration checker rcc) for BGP routers, the status quo in practice was run-time
testing on operational networks [20]. Even rcc was only capable of detecting generic faults
in configurations (e.g. learning unusable paths) and could not prove functional correctness.
More recent verification tools (e.g. AntEater [64], HSA [49], or VeriFlow [52]) have focused
on stronger correctness properties, but are based on ad-hoc foundations, and lack well-defined
specification languages. For example, the NetPlumber [48] verifier includes a specification
language for describing network paths, but the language itself does not have a semantics and
lacks a precise description of what it means for a configuration to satisfy a specification.
This is not just a pedantic, academic point: without a precise semantics that describes
the meaning of a specification and what it means to satisfy it, users cannot reason about
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the specification itself, nor can they have confidence in any purported verification performed
against it. Moreover, anyone who builds a verifier based on such a language has no way of
knowing whether they have even implemented it correctly.
In this chapter, we take a diﬀerent approach. We present a specification language (Pa-
thetic) with clear, precise formal semantics, and show how to use it to encode the require-
ments of an example network program. We then formally describe what it means for a
network implementation (in the form of a NetKAT program) to satisfy a Pathetic specifica-
tion, and show how to design and build a verifier that automatically decides satisfaction.
More specifically, in this chapter, we:
 Define the syntax and semantics of the Pathetic specification language
 Extend NetKAT with new operators (intersection and complement) to enable transla-
tion from Pathetic (NetKAT( ;\))
 Define a semantics-preserving translation from Pathetic to NetKAT( ;\)
 Extend the equational and automata theories of NetKAT to NetKAT( ;\)
 Use the extended theories of NetKAT( ;\) to build a decision procedure for Pathetic
satisfaction
An early version of the Pathetic language appeared in [86].
3.2 Example
We will use the following running example through out the chapter to introduce Pathetic
and demonstrate its features.
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FW1
FW2
E1
E2
I WorldWEB
LB
Figure 3.1: Example topology.
Consider the network shown in Figure 3.1. It consists of one attached network, World, a
webserver Web, an ingress switch I, two firewalls FW1 and FW2, a load balancer LB, and two
egress switches E1 and E2. This network is intended to provide connectivity between Web
and World, subject to a security policy and a load balancing policy. The security policy,
which we will denote by FW, states that all outbound traﬃc (traﬃc originating at Web
and destined for World) must traverse a firewall before reaching an egress switch. The load
balancing policy, denoted by LB, states that all inbound traﬃc destined for the webserver
(traﬃc originating in World and destined for an address denoted Web), must traverse the
load balancer LB before reaching the ingress switch I.
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The network is implemented with SDN switches, managed by a single controller Controller
as shown in Figure 3.21. For simplicity, we assume the switches are connected to the controller
via a separate control network, independent from the network in the example. Because this
chapter deals only with static network configurations and is agnostic to the mechanism used
to implements them in the network, the techniques in this chapter are equally applicable
when the switches are connected to the controller via the primary data network (so called
“inband control”).
The network is managed by an application, which receives network events (switches
connecting, responses to queries, etc) and sends out network programs written in the network
programming language NetKAT. A compiler takes the network programs, converts them into
switch rules, and gives them to the controller to implement in the network.
To implement the load-balancing policy, the network application might initially install
this NetKAT policy:
pLB , tpDst = 80  nwDst = WEB 
0BBBB@
(sw = E1+ sw = E2)  pt LB
+sw = LB  pt I
+sw = I  pt WEB
1CCCCA
Informally, this policy should be read as “pLB is defined to be equal to the policy that
matches packets with a destination port of 80 and a destination address of WEB, and if the
current switch is E1 or E2 then sends the packet to LB, and if the current switch is LB then
sends the packet to I, and if the current switch is I then sends the packet to WEB”.
We briefly review the syntax and semantics of NetKAT here, but for full details, see
1For review of what an SDN network is, see Section 2.2
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Chapter 2 or Anderson et al. [4]. The policy consists of several terms, composed with the
sequential composition operator  and the parallel composition operator +. The first term is
a predicate (or filter), tpDst = 80, that tests the destination port (tpDst) of packets, letting
them pass through if it is equal to 80, or dropping them if not. This test is sequentially
composed with another predicate, nwDst = WEB, that tests the destination IP address
for equality with the web server WEB’s IP address. Notice that sequentially composing
predicates is equivalent to taking their conjunction. Next, we compose these two predicates
with the parallel composition of several terms. The first term in the parallel composition (or
union) matches packets that are at either E1 or E2 (parallel composition of predicates is the
same as their disjunction), and sends them to the port connected to LB. Similarly, the next
terms matches packets on LB and sends them to the port connected to I. Finally, the last
term matches packets that have arrived at I and sends them to the port connected to WEB.
This policy describes the switch forwarding behavior, but NetKAT programs actually
encode the full network behavior, including the topology. Generally, the topology term is
provided by the controller and composed with the switch forward term. A snippet of the
topology term for our network would be written as follows:
t , sw = E1  pt = FW1  sw  FW1  pt E1
+ sw = E1  pt = FW2  sw  FW2  pt E1
+ sw = E1  pt = LB  sw  LB  pt E1
+ sw = E1  pt = I  sw  I  pt E1
: : :
To construct the term describing the full network, we would compose the switch forwarding
term, the term dup, and the topology term, and iterate them using the  operator:
(pLB  dup  t)
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Controller
Compiler
Application
programs
Events
rules
Figure 3.2: Running example control architecture.
The constant dup and requires explanation. NetKAT’s semantics is given as a function
from histories (non-empty lists of packet headers) to sets of histories. Atomic NetKAT
terms (such as header predicates and modifications) work on the head packet of the current
history. The operation dup duplicates the head packet, putting the new copy on the top of
the list. This is how histories remember past values of packets, and how the semantics models
paths through the network. In practice, programmers do not program with dup directly; it
is instead inserted in the appropriate place along with the topology term.
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3.3 The Pathetic specification language
In this section we introduce Pathetic, a specification language based on regular expressions
over network paths with wildcards, and demonstrate its use through the running example
introduced in the previous section. While Pathetic is, in one sense, strictly less expressive
than NetKAT2, it is in fact specialized to serve a diﬀerent role. In Pathetic, alternation is
interpreted disjunctively (i.e. choose one of the following), while in NetKAT alternation is
interpreted conjunctively (i.e. perform all of the following). Thus, a Pathetic program can
specify multiple possible NetKAT implementations. As the examples in this chapter will
show, by utilizing the wildcard operator and the iteration operator, a Pathetic program can
succinctly describe only the essential details of a path that matter for correctness.
Load balancing policy Consider the load balancer requirement from the running exam-
ple: all web traﬃc destined for the server WEB must traverse LB before reaching the ingress
switch I. We can write down this specification in Pathetic as LB:
LB , WEB ] :WEB
where
WEB , (tpDst = 80  nwDst = WEB)) (:WEB):LB:(?):WEB
:WEB , :(tpDst = 80  nwDst = WEB)) ?
The policy LB is written as the union of two atomic Pathetic policies, WEB and other.
Atomic policies such as WEB consist of a predicate (tpDst = 80nwDst = WEB) describing the
packets that the policy applies to, and a path expression ((:WEB):LB:(?):WEB) describing
2All Pathetic programs are translatable into semantically NetKAT programs, but not vice versa
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the valid paths. Predicates are expressed using the syntax of the NetKAT predicate language.
(tpDst = 80  nwDst = WEB) matches web traﬃc (tpDst = 80) that is destined for the web
server (nwDst = WEB). The path expression consists of four parts, joined together with
the sequence operator “ :”. In the first part, we use the shorthand :WEB (formally equal to
? \WEB where ? is a wildcard denoting any path of length one), which matches all paths
of length one other than [WEB]. The policy P denotes iteration zero or more times of the
path expression P , thus (:WEB) matches paths of any length that do not traverse WEB.
After this initial path, the packet must traverse LB and then is allowed to take any path (?)
that ends at WEB.
Finally, because Pathetic policies denote total specifications of network behavior (un-
matched packets get dropped), we union this with a fall-through policy :WEB that allows
non-web traﬃc to take any path through the network.
Firewall policy Similarly, we can write down the policy requiring that all outbound traﬃc
traverse either FW1 or FW2 before leaving the network by decomposing it into three parts.
First, all packets (1 denotes the predicate “true”) are allowed to take any path that ends
inside the network (:(E1jE2)):
internal , 1) (?)::(E1jE2)
Second, all traﬃc starting inside the network is allowed to take a path that traverses FW1
or FW2 before leaving the network (via one of the egress switches):
internal external , 1) (:(E1jE2)):(FW1jFW2):(?):(E1jE2)
Third, we allow traﬃc between the egress switches to take arbitrary paths between them:
external external , 1) (E1jE2):(?):(E1jE2)
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Finally, we combine these policies with the union operator to allow any of the paths to
be used:
FW , internal ] internal external ] external external
Combined example To enforce both the firewall policy and the previous load balancing
policy, we combine them using the intersection operator, to impose the requirements of both
policies:
FW LB , FW C LB
The resulting policy FW LB enforces that all outbound traﬃc traverses the firewall, and
that all inbound web traﬃc traverses the load balancer before arriving at the webserver.
3.3.1 Pathetic syntax and semantics
The syntax of Pathetic programs is shown in Figure 3.3a. Atomic Pathetic programs (a )
P) consist of two parts: a regular expression over network elements describing a set of
valid paths (P), and a predicate defining the set of packets that the regular expression
applies to (a). Atomic path regular expressions are either the empty path (), the empty
set of paths (;), a constant path of length one (S for some switch S) or a wildcard path
of length 1 (?). Regular expressions can be combined using sequential composition (P :P 0),
non-deterministic choice (P jP 0), complement (P), conjunction (P \ P 0), or iteration (P).
Compound Pathetic programs are constructed with the union of two programs (]0), which
denotes the disjunction of the restrictions of  and 0, or intersection (C0), which denotes
the conjunction of the restrictions of  and 0.
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Syntax
Path exp. P ::=  Empty path
j ; Empty set
j S Explicit switch S
j ? Wildcard hop
j P Complement
j P :P Sequencing
j P jP Alternation
j P \ P Intersection
j P Iteration
Fields f ::= f1 j    j fk
Predicates a; b ::= 1 Identity
j 0 Drop
j f = n Test
j a+ b Disjunction
j a  b Conjunction
j :a Negation
Program  ::= a) P atomic policy
j 1 ] 2 policy union
j 1 C 2 policy intersection
(a)
Path semanticsJPK 2 2SwJK , f[]gJ;K , fgJSK , f[S]gJ?K , f[S] j S 2 SwgJPK , 2Sw n JPKJP :P 0K , JPK  JP 0KJP jP 0K , JPK [ JP 0KJP \ P 0K , JPK \ JP 0KJPK , Sn0 F n
where F 0 = f[]g
and F i+1 = JPK  F i
and A B = fab j a 2 A ^ b 2 Bg
JK 2 PK ! 2Sw
Ja) PK pk , (JPK if JaK pkfg o.w.J1 ] 2K pk , J1K pk [ J2K pkJ1 C 2K pk , J1K pk \ J2K pk
(b)
Figure 3.3: Pathetic syntax and semantics.
Pathetic semantics The semantics of Pathetic is shown in Figure 3.3b. Pathetic programs
denote functions from packets to sets of allowable paths3. ]0 denotes the point-wise union
of  and 0, and  C 0 denotes the point-wise intersection.
Let’s look at LB from our running example, and see how it behaves on a web packet
destined for WEB:
JLBK pk = JWEBK pk [ J:WEBK pk
3Notice that this rules out the possibility of packet modifications
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=8>><>>:
J(:WEB):LB:(?):WEBK if J(tpDst = 80  nwDst = WEB)K pk
J?K o.w.
= J(:WEB):LB:(?):WEBK
= J(:WEB)K  JLBK  J(?)K  JWEBK
= J(? \WEB)K  f[LB]g  J(?)K  f[WEB]g
= [iJ? \WEBKi  f[LB]g  J(?)K  f[WEB]g
= [i
 J?K \ JWEBKi  f[LB]g  J(?)K  f[WEB]g
= [i (Sw \ (Sw n f[WEB]g))i  f[LB]g  J(?)K  f[WEB]g
= [i (Sw n f[WEB]g)i  f[LB]g  J(?)K  f[WEB]g
= fP j WEB =2 Pg  f[LB]g  J(?)K  f[WEB]g
= fP [LB]P 0[WEB] j WEB =2 Pg
So, this gives us the set of paths that take any route to LB not through WEB, and then
take any route to WEB, which is exactly what we wanted.
3.3.2 Relating Pathetic to NetKAT
This section assumes familiarity with the NetKAT semantics language model. For more
details, see Chapter 2.
Similar to NetKAT, Pathetic’s semantics gives rise to a derived language model. To see
where the language model comes from, note the isomorphism
JK 2 PK ! 2Sw = PK ! Sw ! 2 = PK  Sw ! 2 = 2PKSw
.
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Language model
G(P)  At  P  (dup  P )
G() , fSS j S 2 Swg
G(;) , fg
G(S) , fS 0SdupS j S 0 2 Swg
G(?) , fSS0dupS0 j S; S 0 2 Swg
G(P) , At  P  (dup  P ) nG(P)
G(P :P 0) , G(P) G(P 0)
G(P jP 0) , G(P) [G(P 0)
G(P \ P 0) , G(P) \G(P 0)
G(P) ,
S
n0 F
n
where F 0 = fSS 0g
and F i+1 = G(P)  F i
G(a) P) , G(a) G(P)
G(1 ] 2) , G(1) [G(2)
G(1 C 2) , G(1) \G(2)
Figure 3.4: Pathetic language model
Recall the language model of NetKAT of reduced strings of the form At  P  (dup  P ),
where At is the set of complete tests on packets (i.e. predicates that match exactly one
packet); P is the set of complete assignments on packets (i.e. a sequence of modifications
on packet headers such that all output packets are the same, regardless of the input packet);
dup is the singleton set containing dup; A  B denotes string concatenation (lifted to sets of
strings); and A denotes [iAi, where Ai+1 , A  Ai and A0 , fg for  the empty string.
We can define a projection from the language model of NetKAT (At  P  (dup  P ))
to PK  Sw by noting that the set of packets is isomorphic to the set of complete packet
tests (PK = At), projecting out the non-switch header values of each P , and dropping dup.
Conversely, we can lift an element of 2PKSw to a subset of At  P  (dup  P ) by extending
each switch S in a path to a complete assignment (where the switch field in the assignment
is set to S), and taking the union over every possible such extension.
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To illustrate this construction, consider the case where we have only one header field:
tpDst (which takes values 0 or 1), and the switch field pt. Here, the element of the NetKAT
language model f(pt = S  tpDst = 0)  (pt  T  tpDst  0)  dup  (pt  U  tpDst  0)g
would get mapped to ftpDst = 0  (T  U)g. Similarly, this element gets mapped back into
the NetKAT model as
f(pt = S  tpDst = 0)  (pt T  tpDst 0)  dup  (pt U  tpDst 0);
(pt = S  tpDst = 0)  (pt T  tpDst 1)  dup  (pt U  tpDst 0);
(pt = S  tpDst = 0)  (pt T  tpDst 0)  dup  (pt U  tpDst 1);
(pt = S  tpDst = 0)  (pt T  tpDst 1)  dup  (pt U  tpDst 1)g
The resulting language model for Pathetic is shown in Figure 3.4. Because path expres-
sions only operate on the sw header of packets, we elide the other fields, and implicitly
perform the extension described above. S denotes the test sw = S, and S the matching
assignment sw  S.
Now that Pathetic and NetKAT have a common semantic domain, we can define what it
means for a NetKAT program to satisfy a specification. Intuitively, we want this to be true
iﬀ every possible path the program forwards packets on is allowed by :
Definition 1. p satisfies , written p  , iﬀ G(p)  JK, where G(p) is the language model
of NetKAT (see Figure 2.3).
3.4 NetKAT( ;\)
Rather than develop a one-oﬀ verifier for Pathetic and NetKAT, we extend NetKAT to a
richer language NetKAT( ;\) that we can translate Pathetic into, and then implement
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an equivalence checker for NetKAT( ;\). We then use this equivalence checker to verify
satisfaction.
Equivalence checking A tool that checks equivalence is a powerful basis for verification.
It is well-known in language theory that many useful problems can be reduced to equivalence
checking. To convince the reader of the utility of this approach, we outline a couple of
examples here.
The Pathetic language is useful for restricting the valid paths a packet can take, but
sometimes a simpler specification such as connectivity is desired: every host in the network
should be able to communicate with every other host. As Foster et al. showed in [25],
connectivity of a policy p can be specified and verified directly in NetKAT itself with an
equivalence checker. Because connectivity does not care about specific paths (only that a
path exists), we first replace all instances of dup in p with 1. This gives us a policy with the
same connectivity behavior, but where packets “magically appear” at their destination with
no record of the path (history) taken through the network. We write this mapping (p).
Then, we check its equivalence against a term encoding the end-to-end forwarding behavior
of a connected network:
(p) 
X
(sw ;sw 0;pt;pt0)
0B@ switch = sw  port = pt 
switch  sw 0  port  pt0
1CA
where (sw ; pt) and (sw 0; pt0) range over all host-facing ports in the network. One advantage
of performing this analysis directly in NetKAT is that both terms are dup-free, which leads
to a much more eﬃcient verification than checking the full program (why this is true will
become clear in later sections).
Similarly, we can use equivalence checking to implement translation validation and check
the correctness of the output of a compiler. The NetKAT compiler translates NetKAT terms
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into a sequence of OpenFlow forwarding rules for each switch. These rules can be directly
encoded back into NetKAT as a cascade of conditional rules:
c = if pat1 then acts1 else
: : :
if patk then actsk else 0
where each pati is a positive conjunction of tests and each acti is a sequence of modifications.
To verify equivalence, we can check if p  (c  t), where t is a term encoding the topology
of the network.
For more examples of encodings of NetKAT verification problems that use equivalence
checking, see Foster et al. [25].
3.4.1 NetKAT( ;\) syntax and semantics
To translate Pathetic, we have extended NetKAT with complement (p) and intersection
(p \ q), as shown in Figure 3.5a. We call this extended language NetKAT( ;\). The
semantics (Figure 3.5b) of the two new operators is the obvious interpretation, except for
the denotation of complement in the history semantics. Instead of defining JpK ::h as the
complement of JpK ::h with respect to the full set of histories, it is instead the complement
with respect to all histories with the same past h as ::h, H jh. The reason for this change
becomes clear when you consider the relation between the history semantics and the language
model: when you sequentially compose two terms, the second term does not get to “rewrite”
history in the language model (it can only extend or discard it).
Once we have defined NetKAT( ;\), the translation from Pathetic into NetKAT( ;\)
(written LM and shown in Figure 3.6) is fairly straightforward.
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Fields f ::= f1 j    j fk
Predicates a; b ::= 1 Identity
j 0 Drop
j f = n Test
j a+ b Disjunction
j a  b Conjunction
j :a Negation
Policies p; q ::= a Filter
j f  n Modification
j p Complement
j p  q Sequence
j p+ q Union
j p \ q Intersection
j p Kleene star
j dup Duplication
(a) NetKAT( ;\) syntax.
JpK 2 H ! P(H)J1K h , fhgJ0K h , ;
Jf = nK ::h , f::hg if :f = n; otherwiseJ:aK h , fhg n (JaK h)Jf  nK ::h , f[f 7! n]::hgJpK ::h , H jh nJpK ::hJp  qK h , (JpK  JqK) hJp+ qK h , JpK h [ JqK hJp \ qK h , JpK h \ JqK hJpK h , Si2N F i h
where F 0 h , fhg and F i+1 h , (JpK  F i) hJdupK (::h) , f::(::h)g
(b) NetKAT( ;\) semantics.
Figure 3.5: NetKAT( ;\).
Theorem 1 (Equivalence of NetKAT translation). For every Pathetic program , G() =
G(LM)
Theorem 2. p   iﬀ LM \ p  0.
Corollary 1. p   iﬀ p  LM.
3.4.2 NetKAT( ;\) equational theory
In this section, we extend the equational theory of NetKAT to NetKAT( ;\), and prove
our axioms complete for a restricted subset. The only content of this section that the reader
should know to understand the rest of the thesis are the axioms themselves, presented in
Figure 3.9. The rest of the section is not essential to understand this chapter, and can safely
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LM , 1L;M , 0LSM , sw  S  dupL?M , PS02Sw sw  S 0  dupLPM , LPMLP :P 0M , LPM  LP 0ML(P jP 0)M , LPM+ LP 0ML(P \ P 0)M , JPK \ JP 0KLPM , LPMLpr ) PM , pr  LPML1 ] 2M , L1M+ L2ML1 C 2M , L1M \ L2M
Figure 3.6: Translation from Pathetic into NetKAT( ;\)
Packet semanticsJpK dup 2 PK ! P(PK)J1K dup  , fgJ0K dup  , ;
Jf = nK dup  , fg if :f = n; otherwiseJ:aK dup  , fg n (JaK dup )Jf  nK dup  , f[f 7! n]gJpK dup  , PK n JpK dup Jp  qK dup  , (JpK dup  JqK dup) Jp+ qK dup  , JpK dup  [ JqK dup Jp \ qK dup  , JpK dup  \ JqK dup JpK dup  , Si2N F i 
where F 0  , fg and F i+1  , (JpK dup  F i) 
dup-free Language model
G dup(p)  At  P
G dup() , fg
G dup() , f j  2 Atg
G dup(p) , At  P nG dup(p)
G dup(p  q) , G dup(p) G dup(q)
G dup(p+ q) , G dup(p) [G dup(q)
G dup(p \ q) , G dup(p) \G dup(q)
G dup(p) ,
S
i2NG dup(p
i)
Figure 3.7: NetKAT( ;\) dup-free semantics and language model.
Language model
G(p)  At  P  (dup  P )
G() , fg
G() , f j  2 Atg
G(p) , At  P  (dup  P ) nG(p)
G(p  q) , G(p) G(q)
G(p+ q) , G(p) [G(q)
G(p \ q) , G(p) \G(q)
G(dup) , fdup j  2 Atg
G(p) ,
S
i2NG(p
i)
Figure 3.8: NetKAT( ;\) language model.
be skipped by the reader.
The original NetKAT language has a sound and complete equational theory, based on
the equational theory of Kleene Algebra with test (KAT) [56]. Because NetKAT( ;\)
is a conservative extension of NetKAT, the NetKAT equational theory is sound, but not
complete for NetKAT( ;\). Unfortunately, we conjecture that there is no finite extension
of the NetKAT axioms that is sound and complete for NetKAT( ;\) (Conjecture 1).
Instead, in this section we give a sound and complete axiomatization of the dup-free
fragment of NetKAT( ;\), as shown in Figure 3.9. The semantics of dup-free NetKAT( ;\)
is given by a semantics over packets, instead of histories, and is shown in Figure 3.7.
For this axiomatization, we use ;  as short-hand to denote complete tests, a conjunction
of header tests f = n such that every header f appears exactly once in a specific order.
Similarly, we use ;  to denote complete assignments, a sequence of header modifications
f  n such that every header f appears exactly once. We write  to denote the complete
test corresponding to  (i.e. the test that matches exactly the packet containing the header
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all ,
P
 
p \ q  q \ p inter-comm
p \ (q \ r)  (q \ p) \ r inter-assoc
p \ p  p inter-idem
a \ b  a  b inter-filter
f  n \ a  f = n  a inter-mod-filter
f  n \ f 0  n0  (f  n  f 0 = n0) + (f 0  n0  f = n) inter-mod-mod
(p+ q) \ r  (p \ r) + (q \ r) inter-par-dist
(p \ q) + r  (p+ r) \ (q + r) par-inter-dist
(a  p) \ q  a  (p \ q) inter-filter-dist-left
(p  a) \ q  (p \ q)  a inter-filter-dist-right
f  n  (p \ q)  (f  n  p) \ (f  n  q) inter-mod-dist-left
f = n  :f = n P  +PP 6=    comp-filter*
f  n  PP 6=[f n]    comp-mod*
p+ q  p \ q comp-par
p \ q  p+ q comp-inter
p  q  T (p    all+   q) comp-seq*
Figure 3.9: NetKAT( ;\) Axioms. Axioms labeled with * are only valid in the dup-free
fragment
values set by ), and  to denote the complete assignment corresponding to . Note that
because the set of headers and the set of header values are both finite, sums over the set of
complete tests and complete assignments are also finite, and thus valid short-hand for the
axioms.
Most of the new axioms for complement and intersection (Figure 3.9) are self-explanatory,
except for the axiom for the complement of a sequential composition, comp-seq. To un-
derstand the axiom, first note that the abbreviation all is a unit for intersection, and an
annihilator for parallel composition in the dup-free fragment. i.e. p\all  p and p+all  all.
Thus, the p  all + q essentially says “if p is non-zero, ignore q”. Looking at the semantics of
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the complement of a sequential composition:
Jp  qK dup pk = [
pk02JpK dup pk
JqK dup pk0
=
\
pk02JpK dup pk
JqK dup pk0
So, this is equivalent to “guessing” each pk0 in JpK dup pk, computing JqK dup pk0, ignoring
the result if we “guessed wrong” (i.e. pk0 2 JpK dup pk), and taking the intersection over all
such guesses.
This trick works for the dup-free fragment because we can filter out the “wrong guesses”
by testing against p. However, it’s not at all clear how to lift this trick to the history
semantics: because terms ignore all but the last packet in the history, we can’t create a term
that filters out “wrong guesses in the past”.
Theorem 3 (dup-free Soundness of NetKAT( ;\) Axioms). For all dup-free policies p and
q, if p  q is provable from the NetKAT( ;\) axioms, then JpK dup = JqK dup.
Theorem 4 (Soundness of non-complement axioms). For all policies p and q, if
p  q
in the equational theory generated by the NetKAT( ;\) axioms minus comp-filter, comp-
mod, and comp-seq, then
JpK = JqK
dup-free completeness The original proof of NetKAT completeness defined a restricted
subset of NetKAT, reduced NetKAT, and showed that every NetKAT term was provably
equivalent to a reduced NetKAT term. Next they gave a language model for reduced NetKAT
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that is isomorphic to the standard (history) semantics. Finally, they defined a normal form
for reduced NetKAT and related it to regular sets of guarded string, and showed that every
reduced NetKAT policy is provably equivalent to a policy in normal form. Completeness
then follows as a corollary of the completeness of KAT.
To prove completeness for NetKAT( ;\), we can carry out a parallel development for
dup-free NetKAT. We then show that we can translate any term in the dup-free fragment
of NetKAT( ;\) language into a provably equivalent term in reduced dup-free NetKAT.
Completeness then follows as an immediate corollary of the completeness of NetKAT itself.4
Lemma 1. Every dup-free NetKAT( ;\) policy is provably equivalent to a reduced NetKAT( ;\)
policy.
Theorem 5. The axioms for NetKAT( ;\) shown in Figure 3.9 plus the NetKAT axioms
(minus PA-DUP-FILTER-COMM) are complete for the dup-free fragment.
Conjecture 1. There does not exist any sound, finite equational extension of the NetKAT
axioms that is complete for NetKAT( ;\).
3.5 NetKAT( ;\) automata theory
At this point, we have presented a specification language Pathetic, defined what it means
for a NetKAT policy to satisfy a specification, and extended NetKAT to NetKAT( ;\) in
order to translate Pathetic.
4At first glance, it might seem that we are missing axioms. For example, we have no axiom explaining
how to take the complement of p. It turns out that such an axiom is unnecessary for the dup-free frag-
ment. Because dup-free NetKAT( ;\) is essentially finite, any instance of star can be transformed into an
equivalent star-free term.
The axioms and the proof are closely tied to the fact that we are working in the dup-free fragment.
To extend the development to the full language would require new axioms for complement, including an
axiomatization of p.
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From here, the road map is as follows: (1) we review the theory of NetKAT( ;\) coalge-
bras, which form the foundation for NetKAT( ;\) automata; (2) we show how to construct
(deterministic) NetKAT( ;\) automata from terms; (3) we describe a bisimulation checker
for NetKAT( ;\) automata. We then appeal to the fact that bisimilarity of NetKAT( ;\)
automata corresponds to language equivalence, and we are done building an equivalence
checker.
3.5.1 NetKAT( ;\) coalgebra
In this section, we briefly review the coalgebraic theory of NetKAT( ;\), and in the next
section show how to use it to build to build an automata-theoretic equivalence checker. This
section is essentially a recapitulation of the development in Foster et al. [25], and we include
it for the sake of completeness. Readers familiar with that paper can safely skip reading this
section.
In this thesis, we take the coalgebraic view of automata, where an automaton is simply a
finite-state coalgebra over a state space S, along with an observation map S ! 2 indicating
accepting states, and a continuation map S  ! S specifying state transitions. For more
details on this approach to representing state-based transition systems, see Rutten [89].
Concretely, a NetKAT coalgebra consists of a state space S, along with observation and
continuation maps
 : S ! 2  : S ! S
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for ;  2 At. A deterministic NetKAT automaton is a finite-state NetKAT coalgebra
with a start state in S. The automaton operates on the (reduced) strings of the language-
model, U = At  P  (dup  P ). If the automaton is in state s, and sees string , then it
accepts iﬀ (s). If the automaton is in state s and sees string dupx, then it transitions
to (s) with residual string x.
A reduced string is accepted by the automaton iﬀ it accepts the string from the distin-
guished start state.
As Foster et al. [25] showed, NetKAT’s automata theory has an analog to Kleene’s
theorem for regular expressions:
Theorem 6 (Kleene’s Theorem for NetKAT). A set of string is G(p) for some NetKAT
policy p iﬀ it is the set of strings accepted by some finite NetKAT automaton.
For the full details of this theorem and its proof, read [25].
3.5.2 NetKAT( ;\) automata
Because NetKAT automata are closed under intersection and complement, it immediately
follows that NetKAT( ;\) automata are in fact NetKAT automata. However, this does not
mean that we can just reuse the NetKAT automata construction. Foster et al. also showed
that the size of the minimal deterministic automata Mp for each NetKAT term p is O(2l),
where l is the number of occurences of dup in p. It is well-known [95] that enriching regular
expressions with complement and intersection causes at least an exponential increase in the
size of the minimal automata [31], to doubly-exponential. This lower-bound also applies to
our language. Therefore, their construction cannot apply to NetKAT( ;\).
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Despite this large theoretical lower-bound, we can still hope to build a verifier that is
performant in practice. By carefully only exploring the reachable state space, and generating
the automata on demand, we can avoid unnecessary work. Moreover, we expect that real-
world specifications will not exhibit the pathological structure that causes such an explosion.
Brzozowski Derivative The Brzozowski derivative is a standard way of building coalge-
bras from regular expressions. There is both a semantic Brzozowski derivative defined upon
subsets of U , giving a NetKAT( ;\) coalgebra over the state space 2U , and a syntactic
Brzozowski derivative defined over NetKAT( ;\) expressions, resulting in a NetKAT( ;\)
coalgebra over a state space of expressions (shown in Figure 3.10).
3.6 Automata Representation
In this section, we show how to build a Pathetic verifier based upon the automata theory
in the previous section. We start by outlining the Brzozowski-based construction and rep-
resentation used by Foster et al. for NetKAT verifier, and explain why this representation
does not work for NetKAT( ;\). We then present our own construction, also based on the
Brzozowski derivative.
Foster et al.’s automata representation Looking carefully at the definition of the
Brzozowski derivatives, it becomes clear that each of the definitions corresponds to operations
on At  At matrices, where E(p) is the ;  entry of the matrix E(p). For example, the
definition of E(p  q) is exactly the definition of matrix multiplication. Moreover, as Foster
et al. note, for NetKAT, these matrices are highly sparse, and “close” to a diagonal matrix.
Consider, for example, E(f = n). This corresponds to a diagonal binary matrix where
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D0() = 0 D
0
(b) = 0 D
0
(dup) = [ = ]
D0(p) = D
0
(p)
D0(p+ q) = D
0
(p) +D
0
(q)
D0(p  q) = D0(p)  q +
P

E(p) D0(q)
D0(p \ q) = D0(p) \D0(q)
D0(p
) = D0(p)  p +
P

E(p) D0(p)
D(p) =  D0(p)
E() = [ = ] E(b) = [ =   b] E(dup) = 0
E(p) = E(p) E(p+ q) = E(p) + E(q)
E(p \ q) = E(p)  E(q)
E(p  q) =
P

E(p)  E(q)
E(p
) = [ = ] +
P

E(p)  E(p):
Figure 3.10: NetKAT( ;\) syntactic Brzozowski derivative.
entry  is 1 iﬀ the f value of  is n. By using a sparse matrix representation based upon
these vectors (and similar vectors corresponding to modifications), they obtain a compact
representation that requires much less space than the jAtj2 entries of the full matrix. Note
that j At j= f j vf j, where vf is the set of values for header field f , i.e. exponential in the
number of fields.
Second, they observe that the size of the state space S can be bounded based upon the
structure of the term. They identify a set of subterms, dubbed spines, whose size is linear in
l, the number of occurrences of dup in the original expression, and show that sets of spines
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suﬃce as a representation of S. Note that the linear bound on the set of spines this leads
directly to an exponential bound on the size of S: 2l.
Unfortunately, neither of these tricks will work for NetKAT( ;\). The complement
operation of NetKAT( ;\) takes a sparse matrix to its complement, which is a dense matrix.
This eliminates the benefits of their sparse matrix representation. Similarly, their small set of
spines no longer suﬃces to represent the state space. This is immediately obvious because
using spines leads to an exponential bound on the size of the state space, but minimal
NetKAT( ;\) automata may be super-exponentially sized.
3.6.1 NetKAT( ;\) automata representation
We use a diﬀerent, novel representation for NetKAT( ;\) derivatives that retains the ben-
efits of the sparse representation of Foster et al. when possible. We combine an eﬃcient
representation of sparse matrices, based on functional decision diagrams, with an algebraic
representation of matrix operations. This enables the verifier to exploit sparseness for posi-
tive terms (terms without complement), and allows the recognition of simplifying algebraic
identities for the full language (e.g. p  p, p+ q  p \ q).
NetKAT( ;\) E derivative representation We use functional decision diagrams (FDDs),
a generalization of binary decision diagrams, to represent E matrices. A binary decision di-
agram (BDD) represents a boolean valued function on a set of boolean valued variables
(H ! 2) ! 2, where H is the set of variables. Concretely, a BDD is a directed, acyclic
graph where leaf nodes are labeled with boolean values, and interior nodes are labeled with
variables and have two outgoing edges, representing the two possible values of the variable.
For example,
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v1
1 0
is a BDD that represents the boolean function v1 = 1 (we draw the true edge on the left,
and the false edge on the right).
Similarly, an (H; V;B) FDD, is a directed, acyclic graph that represents a function of
type (H ! V ) ! B, where the variables in H are V valued. We replace the boolean
variables with boolean tests of equality on mutli-valued variables. Thus, an (H; V;B) has as
internal nodes pairs in (HV ), representing boolean tests on the input, with children nodes
representing the path for inputs that satisfy or fail the test, and its leaf nodes are elements
of B. Just as in BDDs, an FDD that represents a highly uniform function may have many
identical subgraphs. Reduced FDDs use structure sharing to eliminate common sub-FDDs,
and can provide very compact representations for uniform functions in which large sets of
inputs have the same output. In this rest of this chapter, FDD means a reduced FDD.
If E is an (H; V;B) FDD, and h is an element of (H ! V ), then we write JEK(h) to
mean the element of B that is output by the function represented by E on the input h.
NetKAT FDDs (herein just FDDs) are (F;N;P(F * N)) FDDs. That is, they directly
represent functions that take packets as input (represented as finite maps from headers f to
header values n), and output sets of (partial) packets (finite maps that may not have values
for all headers). We interpret a NetKAT FDD E as a function of type  !  ! 2 by
E()() = 90 2 JF K() ^   0 = . For example, the FDD f[]g corresponds to the E
derivative of the diagonal 1: ; : = .
Similarly, the FDD representation for E(f  n) is just: f[f = n]g.
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FDD E;E 0 ::= ff * ng
j (f = n)?(E) : (E 0)
JEK 2 At! At! 2JfmigK()() , Pmi [( mi) = ]J(f = n)?(E) : (E 0)K , (JEK()() if [f ] = nJE 0K()() o.w.
Figure 3.11: NetKAT FDD syntax and semantics
NetKAT FDD operations
Ef n , f[f  n]g
Ef=n , (f = n)?(f[]g) : (fg)
Ep+q , Ep [ Eq
Ep\q , Ep \ Eq
Epq , Ep  Eq
Ep , E 0:E1 + Ep  E 0
The basic operations on FDDs are union, intersection, sequential composition, iteration.
The FDD representation is an alternative to the sparse matrix representation of Foster
et al., and suﬀers from the same problem when applied to NetKAT( ;\). Notice that
the FDD representation of the term 1 is very compact. This representation is optimized for
sparse matrices that are close to a diagonal matrix. Consider, by contrast, the representation
of the E derivative of term 1. It is equivalent to ; : 6= . But this function has a very
large representation as an FDD: it is the full tree where every full path through the tree
represents a complete test, and the leaf node on the path corresponding to  is the set
f j  6= g. Even worse, a naive implementation may end up constructing a very large
FDD as an intermediate state when the final FDD is in fact very small. For example,
naively constructing the FDD for 1  1 would result in an FDD equivalent to f[]g, but
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construct the FDD for 1 as an intermediate.
To avoid the blow-up that comes from complementing FDDs, but maintain the benefit of
their compactness when possible, we combine FDDs with the symbolic representation shown
in Figure 3.6.1. Complement-free policies are represented as FDDs (smart constructors
enforce that the union, intersection, iteration, and sequential composition of FDDs are
FDDs), and policies containing complement are represented as formal terms over FDDs.
This enables compact representation of positive NetKAT terms while enabling the recognition
of simplifying algebraic identities. In this representation, the term 1 would be represented
exactly as the FDD f[]g, because the symbolic identity p  p would be recognized and
reduced, without computing the FDD for p.
We write Ep to refer to the FDD representation of the E derivative of the (complement-
free) term p.
NetKAT( ;\) derivative representation
E e; e0 ::= E Positive FDD
j e Complement
j e+ e0 Union
j e \ e0 Intersection
j e  e0 Sequential composition
j e Kleene star
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NetKAT( ;\) derivative representation semantics
JeK 2 At! At! 2
JEK()() , JEK()()
JeK()() , JeK()()
Je+ e0K()() , JeK()() + Je0K()()
Je \ e0K()() , JeK()()  Je0K()()
Je  e0K()() , PJeK()()  Je0K()()JeK()() , [ = ] +PJeK()()  JeK()()
To represent D derivatives, we follow the insight of Foster et al. that the D derivatives
correspond to basic matrix operations, and use a matrix-like representation. We decompose
each D derivative into a sum of (possibly overlapping) single-valued matrices, and represent
each matrix as a pair of an E matrix (representing the domain), and a policy (representing
the value of the matrix on its domain) (shown in Figure 3.12)5. The relationship between
this representation and the syntactic Brzozowski derivative is expressed in Lemma 2:
Lemma 2.
D;(p) 
X
(e;d)2D(p)
[e()()]    d
3.6.2 NetKAT( ;\) equivalence checking
With our automata representation, we can now build an equivalence checker that checks
NetKAT( ;\) terms for bisimulation. Given two NetKAT( ;\) terms p and q, we first
compare their E matrices for (semantic) equality. If they are not equal, we return false.
5This representation is based upon one proposed by Konstantinos Mamouras in private correspondence.
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E(p) = Ep E(b) = Eb E(dup) = E0
E(e) = E(e) E(e1 + e2) = E(e1) + E(e2)
E(e1 \ e2) = E(e1) \ E(e2)
E(e1  e2) = E(e1)  E(e2)
E(e) = E(e)
D(p) = fg D(b) = fg D(dup) = f(E(1); 1)g
D(e1 + e2) = D(e1) [D(e2)
D(e1  e2) = D(e1)  e2 [ E(e1) D(e2)
D(e1 \ e2) = fd1 \ d2 j d1 2 D(e1); d2 2 D(e2)g
D(e) = E(e) D(e)  e
D(p) =
[
;
8<:(E(  p); \
(e0;d0)2D(p)^e0()()
d0)
9=;
where
D  p , f(e; d  p) j (e; d) 2 Dg
E D , f(E  e; d) j (e; d) 2 Dg
(e; d) \ (e0; d0) , (e \ e0; d \ d0)
Figure 3.12: NetKAT( ;\) derivative representation.
Otherwise, we calculate the derivatives of both terms and recursively check them for equiv-
alence. Once we’ve reached every reachable pair of derivatives, the algorithm halts. The
proof of termination depends upon finiteness of an extension of the original NetKAT spines
to NetKAT( ;\), and the closure of these spines under the derivative, which is shown in
Appendix A.1.
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CHAPTER 4
CORRECTLY IMPLEMENTING NETWORK PROGRAMS
“Trust, but verify.”
—Ronald Reagan
In the previous chapter we showed how to verify that a network program correctly im-
plements a specification. In this chapter, we show how to build a system that correctly
implements network programs, guaranteeing that the properties of the input program also
are preserved by the resulting network itself.
Concretely, this chapter describes the design and implementation of a machine-verified
compiler and OpenFlow controller for the NetCore language, a predecessor to NetKAT.
Starting from the foundations, we develop a detailed operational model for the OpenFlow
sdn platform, and formalize it in the Coq proof assistant. We then use this model to develop
a verified compiler and run-time system for a high-level network programming language (Net-
Core). We identify bugs in existing languages and tools built without formal foundations,
and prove that these bugs are absent from our system. Finally, we describe our prototype
implementation and our experiences using it to build practical applications.
The content of this chapter is based upon a joint PLDI paper [35] published with Arjun
Guha and Nate Foster in 2013.
4.1 Introduction
Bugs in compilers and runtimes are especially pernicious sources of errors. Diﬃcult to
track down, their eﬀect can be widespread, potentially aﬀecting every program they touch.
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Indeed, a lack of trust in the reliability of complex optimizing compilers and language runtime
systems is one potential stumbling block in the adoption of high-level programming languages
in the systems domain.
Moreover, recent work has shown that such mistrust would not be entirely misplaced:
NICE [14] found a number of runtime bugs in popular SDN controller platforms, and in
prior work [35] we found correctness bugs in every network programming language compiler
examined.
Fortunately, there is a solution: formal specification and verification of compilers and
runtimes. In one study of optimizing C compilers, every single compiler, save one, was found
to have bugs that caused wrong-code generation [108]. The one exception was the formally
verified compiler from the CompCert project [58]1.
In this chapter, we show how to formally model network programming languages and
software-defined networks in the Coq theorem prover. We then show how to use these
formal models to build and verify a compiler and network controller that provably preserves
the correctness of its input program.
Architecture Our system is organized as a verified software stack (Figure 4.1) that trans-
lates through the following levels of abstraction:
 NetCore. The highest level of abstraction is the NetCore language, proposed in prior
work by Monsanto et al. [74]. NetCore is a predecessor to the NetKAT language used
earlier in this thesis. Unlike NetKAT, NetCore does not directly model the topology of
1Initially, the authors of that study found a bug in an unverified component of CompCert. In response,
CompCert extended the verified to include that component, and the authors were not able to find any bugs
in the newly verified system.
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dlDst = H1 and not(dlTyp = 0x800)) {|1|}
dlDst = H1 and not(dlTyp = 0x800)) {|1|}
dlDst = H1 and not(dlTyp = 0x800)) {|1|}
Priority Pattern Action
5 {dlDst = H1,dlTyp = 0x800} {||}
4 {dlDst = H1} {|1|}
3 ? {||}
Priority Pattern Action
5 {dlDst = H1,dlTyp = 0x800} {||}
4 {dlDst = H1} {|1|}
3 ? {||}
Priority Pattern Action
5 {dlDst = H1,dlTyp = 0x800} {||}
4 {dlDst = H1} {|1|}
3 ? {||}
  Add 5 {dlDst = H1,dlTyp = 0x800} {||}
  Add 5 {dlDst = H1,dlTyp = 0x800} {||}
  Add 5 {dlDst = H1,dlTyp = 0x800} {||}
Figure 4.1: System architecture.
the network, and so is essentially equivalent to dup-free NetKAT. NetCore also lacks
the iteration operator of NetKAT, but iteration adds no expressivity to the dup-free
fragment, so this is not a significant loss.
 Flow tables. The intermediate level of abstraction is flow tables, a representation
that sits between NetCore programs and switch-level configurations. There are two
main diﬀerences between NetCore programs and flow tables. First, NetCore programs
describe the forwarding behavior of a whole network, while flow tables describe the
behavior of a single switch. Second, flow tables process packets using a linear scan
through a list of prioritized rules. Hence, to translate operators such as union and
negation, the NetCore compiler must generate a sequence of rules that encodes the
same semantics. However, because flow table matching uses a lower-level packet repre-
sentation (as nested frames of Ethernet, ip, tcp, etc. packets), flow tables must satisfy
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a well-formedness condition to rule out invalid patterns that are inconsistent with this
representation.
 Featherweight OpenFlow. The lowest level of abstraction is Featherweight Open-
Flow, a new foundational model we have designed that captures the essential features
of sdns. Featherweight OpenFlow models switches, the controller, the network topol-
ogy, as well as their internal transitions and interactions in a small-step operational
semantics. This semantics is non-deterministic, modeling the asynchrony inherent in
networks. To implement a flow table in a Featherweight OpenFlow network, the con-
troller instructs switches to install or uninstall rules as appropriate while dealing with
two important issues: First, switches process instructions concurrently with packets
flowing through the network, so it must ensure that at all times the rules installed
on switches are consistent with the flow table. Second, switches are allowed to buﬀer
instructions and apply them in any order, so it must ensure that the behavior is cor-
rect no matter how instructions are reordered through careful use of synchronization
primitives.
4.2 Overview
To motivate the need for verified SDN controllers, consider a simplified version of the network
from our running example, shown in Figure 4.2. This network has only one switch I, one
firewall FW, a load balancer LB, a web server WEB, an internal network INTRANET, and an
external network WORLD.
Now imagine we want to build an SDN controller that implements the following network
policy: block inbound ssh traﬃc, route inbound http requests through the load-balancer
and then to WEB, and allow all other traﬃc to INTRANET once it has passed through the
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FWI
World
WEB
LB
Intranet
Figure 4.2: Example network topology.
firewall. It is straightforward to formalize this policy as a packet-processing function that
maps input packets to (possibly several) output packets: the function drops ssh packets
a forwards http packets both to their destination and to the middlebox, and forwards all
other packets to the firewall and then their destination.
To implement this function in an sdn, however, we would need to specify several addi-
tional low-level details, since switches cannot implement general packet-processing functions
directly. First, the controller would need to encode the function as a flow table—a set of
prioritized forwarding rules. Second, it would need to send the switch a series of control mes-
sages to add individual entries from the flow table, incrementally building up the complete
table.
More concretely, the controller could first send a message instructing the switch to add
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a flow table entry that blocks ssh traﬃc:
Add 10 ftpDst = 22g fjjg
Here 10 is a priority number, {tpDst =22} is a pattern that matches ssh traﬃc (tcp port
22), and fjjg is an empty multiset of ports, which drops packets, as intended. Next, the
controller could add an entry to process inbound http requests:
Add 9 finPort = WORLD;dlDst = WEB; tpDst = 80g fjLBjg
Note that this rule only applies to http (tcp port 80) packets traﬃc that has not been sent
to LB yet.
The controller can then add another entry to process load-balanced http requests:
Add 8 finPort = LB;dlDst = WEB; tpDst = 80g fjWEBjg
Finally, the controller could similarly install a pair of entries to forward other packets to
their destination, after going through the firewall
Add 2 finPort = WORLDg fjFWjg
Add 1 finPort = FWg fjINTRANETjg
Note that this rule does not apply to ssh and http traﬃc, since those packets are handled
by the higher-priority rules.
After these control messages have been sent, it would be natural to expect that the net-
work correctly implements the packet-processing function described above. But the situation
is actually more complicated: switches have substantial latitude in how they process mes-
sages from the controller, and packets may arrive at any time during processing. Establishing
that the network correctly implements this function—in particular, that it blocks ssh traﬃc
and load balances http traﬃc—requires additional reasoning.
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Controller-switch consistency. Switches process packets and control messages concur-
rently. In our example, the switch may receive an http request before the flow table entry
that handles http packets arrives. In this case, the switch will send the packet to the
controller for further processing. Since the controller is a general-purpose machine, it can
implement the packet-processing function directly, apply it to the incoming packet, and send
the results back to the switch. However, this means that sdn controllers typically have two
diﬀerent implementations of the function: one residing at the controller and another on the
switches. A key property we verify is that these two implementations are consistent.
Message reordering. sdn switches may process control messages in any order, and many
switches do, to maximize performance. But unrestricted reordering can cause implementa-
tions to violate their intended specifications. For example, if the rule to drop ssh traﬃc
is installed after the final, low-priority rule that forwards all traﬃc, then ssh traﬃc will
temporarily be forwarded by the low-priority rule, breaking the intended security policy. To
ensure that such reorderings do not occur, a controller must carefully insert barrier messages,
which force the switch to process all outstanding messages. A key property we verify is that
controllers use barriers correctly (several unverified controllers ignore this issue).
Natural patterns. Another complication is that the patterns presented earlier in this
section, such as ftpDst = 22g, are actually invalid. To match ssh traﬃc, it is not enough
to simply state that the destination port must be 22. The pattern must also specify that
the Ethernet frame type must be ip, and the transport protocol must be tcp. Without
these additional constraints, switches will interpret the pattern as a wildcard that matches
all packets. Several earlier controller platforms did not properly account for this behavior,
and had bugs as a result. We develop a semantics for patterns and identify a class of natural
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Packet pk ::=Eth dlSrc dlDst dlTyp nwPk
Network layer nwPk ::= IP nwSrc nwDst nwProto tpPk
j Unknown payload
Transport layer tpPk ::=TCP tpSrc tpDst payload
j Unknown payload
Figure 4.3: Logical packet structure.
patterns that are closed under the algebraic operations used by our compiler and flow table
optimizer.
Roadmap. The rest of this chapter develops techniques for establishing that a given
packet-processing function is implemented correctly by an OpenFlow network. More specif-
ically, we tackle the problem of verifying high-level programming abstractions, using Net-
Core [74] as a concrete instance of a high-level network language. The next section presents
NetCore in detail. The following sections describe general and reusable techniques for es-
tablishing the correctness of sdn controllers, including NetCore.
4.3 NetCore
This section presents the highest layer of our verified stack: the NetCore language. A
NetCore program specifies how the switches process packets at each hop through the network.
More formally, a program denotes a total function from port-packet pairs to multisets of port-
packet pairs. The syntax and semantics of a core NetCore fragment are shown in Fig. 4.4.
To save space, we have elided several header fields and operators not used in this chapter.
We can build a NetCore program that implements the example from the previous section
by composing several smaller NetCore program fragments. The first fragment forwards traﬃc
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Switch id sw 2 N
Port id pt 2 N
Headers h ::=dlSrc j dlDst mac address
j dlTyp Ethernet frame type
j nwSrc j nwDst ip address
j nwProto ip protocol code
j tpSrc j tpDst transport port
Predicate pr ::= ? wildcard
j h = n match header
j on sw match switch
j at match inport
j not pr predicate negation
j pr 1 and pr 2 predicate conjunction
Program  ::= pr ) fjpt1    ptnjg basic program
j 1 ] 2 program union
j restrict  by pr program restriction
JprK sw pt pk
J?K sw pt pk = trueJdlSrc=nK sw pt (Eth dlSrc ) = dlSrc=nJnwSrc=nK sw pt (Eth (IP nwSrc )) = nwSrc=nJnwSrc=nK sw pt (Eth (Unknown )) = false
  Jon sw 0K sw pt pk = sw=sw 0Jat 0K sw pt pk = pt=pt0Jnot prK sw pt pk = :(JprK sw pt pk)Jpr 1 and pr 2K sw pt pk = Jpr 1K sw pt pk ^ Jpr 2K sw pt pk
JK sw pt pk = fj(pt1; pk1)    (ptn; pkn)jg
Jpr ) fjpt1    ptnjgK sw pt pk =
if JprK sw pt pk then fj(pt1; pk)    (ptn; pk)jg else fjjgJ1 ] 2K sw pt pk =J1K sw pt pk ] J2K sw pt pkJrestrict  by prK sw pt pk =
fj(pt0; pk0) j (pt0; pk0) 2 JpgK sw pt pk ^ JprK sw pt pkjg
Figure 4.4: NetCore syntax and semantics (extracts).
to WEB:
1 , at LB and dlDst=WEB) fjWEBjg
This basic program consists of a predicate pr and a multiset of actions fjpt1    ptnjg. The
predicate denotes a set of port-packet pairs, and the actions denote the ports (if any) where
those packets should be forwarded on the next hop. In this instance, the predicate denotes
the set of all packets whose Ethernet destination (dlDst) address has the specified value,
and whose inport is LB, and the actions denote a transformation that forwards matching
packets to port 1. Note that we represent packets as nested sequences of frames (Ethernet,
ip, tcp, etc.) as shown in Fig. 4.3. NetCore provides predicates for matching on well-known
header fields as well as logical operators such as and and or, unlike hardware switches,
which only provide prioritized sets of rules.
The next fragment is similar to 1, but forwards traﬃc to LB instead of WEB:
2, at WORLD and dlDst=WEB) fjLBjg
Using the union operator, we can combine these programs into a single program that imple-
ments forwarding for http traﬃc:
WEB , 1 ] 2
Semantically, the ] operator produces the (multiset) union of the results produced by each
sub-program. Using the restriction operator restrict by , we can limit this forwarding
policy to web traﬃc:
restrict WEB by tpDst=22
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Similarly, we can define the forwarding policy for traﬃc through the firewall:
01, at WORLD and not dlDst=WEB) fjFWjg
02, at FW and not dlDst=WEB) fjINTRANETjg
FW,01 ] 02
Finally, we can add the security policy using the restrict by operator, which restricts
a program by a predicate:
restrict (WEB ] FW) by (not tpDst=22)
This program is similar the previous one, but drops ssh traﬃc.
The advantages of using a declarative language such as NetCore should be clear: it
provides abstractions that make it easy to establish network-wide properties through com-
positional reasoning. For example, simply by inspecting the final program and using the
denotational semantics (Fig. 4.4), we can easily verify that the network blocks ssh traﬃc,
forwards http traﬃc to the middlebox, and other forwards traﬃc to INTRANET. In par-
ticular, even though a controller, switches, flow tables, forwarding rules, are all involved in
implementing this program, we do not have to reason about them! This is in contrast to
lower-level controller platforms, which require programmers to explicitly construct switch-
level forwarding rules, issue messages to install those rules on switches, and reason about
the asynchronous interactions between switches and controller. Of course, the complexity of
the underlying system is not eliminated, but relocated from the programmer to the language
implementers. This is an eﬃcient tradeoﬀ: functionality common to many programs can be
implemented just once, proved correct, and reused broadly.
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Wildcard w ::=n j ?
Pattern pat ::= fdlSrc = w;dlDst = w;dlTyp = w;
nwSrc = w;nwDst = w;nwProto = w;
tpSrc = w; tpDst = wg
Flow table FT 2 fjn  pat  fjptjgjg
JFT K pt pk  fjpt1    ptnjg  fjpk1    pkmjg
9(n; pat ; fjpt1    ptnjg) 2 FT :
pk#pat = true
8(n 0; pat 0; pts 0) 2 FT : n 0 > n )
pk#pat 0 = falseJFT K pt pk  (fj(pt1)    (ptn)jg; fjjg) (Matched)
8(n; pat ; pts) 2 FT pk#pat = falseJFT K pt pk  (fjjg; fj(pt; pk)jg) (Unmatched)
pk#pat
(Eth dlSrc dlDst dlTyp nwPk)#pat =
dlSrc v pat :dlSrc ^ dlDst v pat :dlDst ^
dlTyp v pat :dlTyp ^
(pat :dlTyp = 0x800) nwPk#nwpat)
nwPk#nwpat
(IP nwSrc nwDst nwProto tpPk)#nwpat =
nwSrc v pat :nwSrc ^ nwDst v pat :nwDst ^
nwProto v pat :nwProto ^
(pat :nwProto = 6) tpPk#tppat)
(Unknown payload)#nwpat = true
tpPk#tppat
(TCP tpSrc tpDst payload)#tppat =
tpSrc v pat :tpSrc ^ tpDst v pat :tpDst
Unknown payload#tppat = true
n v w
m v n = m=n n v ? = true
Figure 4.5: Flow table syntax and semantics.
4.4 Flow Tables
The first step toward executing a NetCore program in an sdn involves compiling it to a
prioritized set of forwarding rules—a flow table. Flow tables are an intermediate represen-
tation that play a similar role in NetCore to register transfer language (rtl) in traditional
compilers. Flow tables are more primitive than NetCore programs because they lack the
logical structure induced by NetCore operators such as union, intersection, negation, and
restriction. Also, the patterns used to match packets in flow tables are more restrictive than
NetCore predicates. And unlike NetCore programs, which denote total functions, flow tables
are partial: switches redirect unmatched packets to the controller.
As defined in Fig. 4.5, a flow table consists of a multiset of rules (n; pat ; pts) where n
is an integer priority, pat is a pattern, and pts is a multiset of ports. A pattern is a record
that associates each header field to either an integer constant n or the special wildcard value
?. When writing flow tables, we often elide headers set to ? in patterns as well as priorities
when they are clear from context.
Pattern semantics. The semantics of patterns is given by the function pk#pat , as defined
in Fig. 4.5. This turns out to be subtly complicated, due to the representation of packets
as sequences of nested frames—a pattern contains a (possibly wildcarded) field for every
header field, but not all packets contain every header field. Some fields only exist in specific
frame types (dlTyp) or protocols (nwProto). For example, only ip packets (dlTyp =
0x800) have ip source and destination addresses. Likewise, tcp (nwProto = 6) and udp
(nwProto = 17) packets have source and destination ports, but icmp (nwProto = 1)
packets do not.
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To match on a given field, a pattern must specify values for all other fields it depends
on. For example, to match on ip addresses, the pattern must also specify that the Ethernet
frame type is ip:
fdlTyp = 0x800;nwSrc = 10.0.0.1g
If the frame type is elided, the value of the dependent header is silently ignored and the
pattern is equivalent to a wildcard:
fnwSrc = 10.0.0.1g  fg
In eﬀect, patterns not only match packets, but also determine how they are parsed. This
behavior, which was ambiguous in early versions of the OpenFlow specification (and later
fixed), has lead to real bugs in existing controllers (Section 4.5). Although unintuitive for
programmers, this behavior is completely consistent with how packet processing is imple-
mented in modern switch hardware.
Flow table semantics. The semantics of flow tables is given by the relation JK. The
relation has two cases: one for matched packets and another for unmatched packets. Each
flow table entry is a tuple containing a priority n, pattern pat , and a multiset of ports
fjpt1    ptnjg. Given a packet and its input port, the semantics forwards the packet to all ports
in the multiset associated with the highest-priority matching rule in the table. Otherwise, if
no matching rule exists, it diverts the packet to the controller. In the formal semantics, the
first component of the result pair represents forwarded packets while the second component
represents diverted packets. Note that flow table matching is non-deterministic if there
are multiple matching entries with the same priority. This has serious implications for
a compiler—e.g., naively combining flow tables with overlapping priorities could produce
incorrect results. In the NetCore compiler, we avoid this issue by always working with
unambiguous and total flow tables.
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P : sw  pr ! [(pat ;bool)]
P(sw;dlSrc = n) = [(fdlSrc = ng; true)]
P(sw;nwSrc = n) = [(fdlTyp = 0x800;nwSrc = ng; true)]
  
P(sw ; at sw) = [(?; true)]
P(sw; at sw 0) = [(?; false)] where sw 6= sw 0
P(sw;not pr) = [(pat1;:b1)    (patn;:bn); (?; false)]
where [(pat1; b1)    (patn; bn)] = P(sw; pr)
P(sw; pr and pr 0) =
[(pat1 \ pat 01; b1 ^ b01)    (patm \ pat 0n; bm ^ b0n)]
where [(pat1; b1)    (patm; bm)] = P(sw; pr)
where [(pat 01; b01)    (pat 0n; b0n)] = P(sw; pr 0)
C : sw  ! [(pat ; pt)]
C(sw ; pr ) pt)= [(pat1; pt1)    (patn; ptn); (?; fjjg)]
where [(pat1; b1);    ; (patn; bn)] = P(sw; pr)
where pti = pt if bi = true
where pti = fjjg if bi = false
C(sw ;  ] 0) =
[(pat1 \ pat 01; pt1 ] pt01);    ; (patm \ pat 0n; ptm ] pt0n)] ++
[(pat1; pt1)    (patm; ptm)] ++
[(pat 01; pt
0
1)    (pat 0n; pt0n)]
where [(pat1; pt1)    (patm; ptm)] = P(sw; )
where [(pat 01; pt01)    (pat 0n; pt0n)] = P(sw; 0)
Figure 4.6: NetCore compilation.
4.5 Verified NetCore Compiler
With the syntax and semantics of NetCore and flow tables in place, we now present a verified
compiler for NetCore. The compiler takes programs as input and generates a set of flow tables
as output, one for every switch. The compilation algorithm is based on previous work [74],
but we have verified its implementation in Coq. While building the compiler, we found two
serious bugs in the original algorithm related to the handling of (unnatural) patterns in the
compiler and flow table optimizer.
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The compilation function C, defined in Fig. 4.6, generates a flow table for a given switch
sw . It uses the auxiliary function P to compile predicates. The compiler produces a list
of pattern-action pairs, but priority numbers are implicit: the pair at the head has highest
priority and each successive pair has lower priority.
Because NetCore programs denote total functions, packets not explicitly matched by any
predicate are dropped. In contrast, flow tables divert unmatched packets to the controller.
The compiler resolves this discrepancy by adding a catch-all rule that drops unmatched
packets. For example, we compile the NetCore policy that forwards packets coming from the
mac address H1 to port 5 into a flow table with two rules, one that forwards these packets
to port 5, and a lower priority rule that matches all (remaining) packets and drops them:
C(sw ;dlSrc =H1) fj5jg)=fj(2; fdlSrc =H1g; fj5jg); (1; ?; fjjg)jg
The key operator used by the compiler constructs the cross-product of the flow tables pro-
vided as input. This operator can be used to compute intersections and unions of flow tables.
Note that implementing union in the obvious way—by concatenating flow tables—would be
wrong. The cross-product operator performs an element-wise intersection of the input flow
tables and then merges their actions. To compile a union, we first use cross-product to build
a flow table that represents the intersection, and then concatenate the flow tables for the
sub-policies at lower priority. For example, the following NetCore program,
dlSrc = H1) fj5jg ] dlDst = H2) fj10jg
compiles to a flow table:
Priority Pattern Action
4 fdlSrc = H1;dlDst = H2g fj5; 10jg
3 fdlSrc = H1g fj5jg
2 fdlDst = H2g fj10jg
1 ? fjjg
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The first rule matches all packets that match both sub-programs, while the second and third
rules match packets only matched by the left and the right programs respectively. The final
rule drops all other packets. The compilation of other predicates uses similar manipulations
on flow tables.
We have built a large library of flow table manipulation operators in Coq, along with
several lemmas that state useful algebraic properties about these operators. With this library,
proving the correctness theorem for the NetCore compiler is simple—only about 200 lines of
code in Coq.
Theorem 7 (NetCore Compiler Soundness). For all NetCore programs , switches sw , ports
pt, and packets pk we have JC(sw ; )K pt pk = JK sw pt pk.
Intuitively, this theorem states that a flow table compiled from a NetCore program for a
switch sw has the same behavior as the NetCore program evaluated on packets at sw .
Compiler bugs. In the course of our work, we discovered that several unverified compilers
from high-level network programming languages to flow tables suﬀer from bugs due to subtle
pattern semantics. Section 4.4 described inter-field dependencies in patterns. For example,
to match packets from ip address 10.0.0.1, we write
fnwSrc = 10.0.0.1;dlTyp = 0x800g
and if we omit the dlTyp field, the ip address is silently ignored. This unintuitive behavior
has led to bugs in pane [22] and Nettle [103] as well as an unverified version of NetCore [74].
To illustrate, consider the following program:
nwSrc = 10.0.0.1) fj5jg
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In NetCore, this program matches all ip packets from 10.0.0.1 and forwards them out port
5. But the original NetCore compiler produced the following flow table for this program:
Priority Pattern Action
2 fnwSrc = 10.0.0.1g fj5jg
1 ? fjjg
In OpenFlow, because the first pattern does not specify dlTyp = 0x800, it is actually
equivalent to the all-wildcard pattern and this flow table sends all traﬃc out port 5. Both
pane and Nettle have similar bugs. Nettle has a special case to handle patterns with ip
addresses that do not specify dlTyp = 0x800, but it does not correctly handle patterns that
specify a transport port number but not the nwProto field. pane suﬀers from the same
bug. Even worse, these invalid patterns lead to further bugs when flow tables are combined
and optimized by the compiler.
Natural patterns. The verified NetCore compiler does not suﬀer from the bug above. In
our formal development, we require that all patterns manipulated by the compiler be what
we call natural patterns. A natural pattern has the property that if the pattern specifies the
value of a field, then all of that field’s dependencies are also met. This rules out patterns
such as fnwSrc = 10.0.0.1g, which omits the Ethernet frame type necessary to parse the
IP address. Natural patterns are easy to define using dependent types in Coq. Moreover,
we can calculate the cross-product of two natural patterns by intersecting fields point-wise.
Hence, it is easy to prove that natural patterns are closed under intersection.
Lemma 3. If pat1 and pat2 are natural patterns, then pat1 \ pat2 is also a natural pattern.
Another important property is that all patterns can be expressed as some equivalent natural
pattern (where patterns are equivalent if they denote the same set of packets). This property
tells us that we do not lose expressiveness by restricting to natural patterns.
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Lemma 4. If pat is an arbitrary pattern, then there exists a natural pattern pat 0, such that
pat  pat 0.
These lemmas are used extensively in the proofs of correctness for our compiler and flow
table optimizer.
Flow table optimizer. The basic NetCore compilation algorithm described so far gener-
ates flow tables that correctly implement the semantics of the input program. But many flow
tables have redundant entries that could be safely removed. For example, a naive compiler
might translate the program (? ) fj5jg) to the flow table fj(2; ?; fj5jg); (1; ?; fjjg)jg, which
is equivalent to fj(2; ?; fj5jg)jg. Worse, because the compilation rule for union uses a cross-
product operator to combine the flow tables computed for sub-programs, the output can be
exponentially larger than the input. Without an optimizer, such a naive compiler is essen-
tially useless—e.g., we built an unoptimized implementation of the algorithm in Fig. 4.6 and
found that it ran out of memory when compiling a program consisting of just 9 operators.
Our compiler is parameterized on a function O : FT ! FT , that it invokes at each recur-
sive call. Because even simple policies can see a combinatorial explosion during compilation,
this inline reduction is necessary. We stipulate that O must produce equivalent flow tables:
JO(FT )K = JFT K.
We have built an optimizer that eliminates low-priority entries whose patterns are fully
subsumed by higher-priority rules and proved that it satisfies the above condition in Coq.
Although this optimization is quite simple, it is eﬀective in practice. In addition, earlier
attempts to implement this optimization in NetCore had a bug that incorrectly identified
certain rules as overlapping which we did not discover until developing this proof. The pane
optimizer also had a bug—it assumed that combining identical actions is always idempotent.
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Switch S ::=S(sw ; pts;FT ; inp ; outp ; inm ; outm)
Controller C ::=C(; fin ; fout)
Link L ::=L((sw src ; ptsrc); pks; (swdst ; ptdst))
Link to Controller M ::=M(sw ;SMS ;CMS )
Devices
Ports on switch pts 2fptg
Input/output buﬀers inp ; outp 2fj(pt; pk)jg
Messages from controller inm 2fjSM jg
Messages to controller outm 2fjCM jg
Switch Components
Controller state 
Controller input relation fin 2 sw  CM    
Controller output relation fout 2   sw  SM  
Controller Components
Queue from controller SMS 2 [SM 1   SM n]
Queue to controller CMS 2 [CM 1   CM n]
Controller Link
From controller SM ::=FlowMod  j PktOut pt pk j BarrierRequest n
To controller CM ::=PktIn pt pk j BarrierReply n
Table update  ::=Add n pat act j Del pat
Figure 4.7: Featherweight OpenFlow syntax
Both of these bugs led to incorrect behavior.
4.6 Featherweight OpenFlow
The next step towards executing NetCore programs is a controller that configures the
switches in the network. To prove that such a controller is correct, we need a model of
the network. Unfortunately, the OpenFlow 1.0 specification, consisting of 42 pages of infor-
mal prose and C definitions, is not amenable to rigorous proof.
This section presents Featherweight OpenFlow, a detailed operational model that cap-
tures the essential features of OpenFlow networks, and yet still fits on a single page. The
model elides a number of details such as error codes, counters, packet modification, and
advanced configuration options such as the ability to enable and disable ports. But it does
include all of the features related to how packets are forwarded and how flow tables are
modified. Many existing sdn bug-finding and property-checking tools are based on similar
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JFT K(pt; pk) (fjpt01    pt0njg; fjpk01    pk0mjg) out = fjPktIn pt pk01   PktIn pt pk0mjg
S(sw ; ;FT ; fj(pt; pk)jg ] inp ; outp ; ; outm)
(sw ;pt;pk)      ! S(sw ; ;FT ; inp ; fj(pt01; pk)    (pt0n; pk)jg ] outp ; ; out ] outm)
(Fwd)
S(sw ; : : : ; fj(pt; pk)jg ] outp ; : : :) j L((sw ; pt); pks; )  ! S(sw ; : : : ; outp ; : : :) j L((sw ; pt); [pk] ++pks; )
(Wire-Send)
L( ; pks ++ [pk] ; (sw ; pt)) j S(sw ; : : : ; inp ; : : :)  ! L( ; pks; (sw ; pt)) j S(sw ; : : : ; fj(pt; pk)jg ] inp ; : : :)
(Wire-Recv)
S(: : : ;FT ; : : : ; fjFlowMod Add m pat act jg ] inm ; )  ! S(: : : ;FT ] fj(m; pat ; act)jg; : : : ; inm ; )
(Add)
FT rem = fj(n 0; pat 0; act 0) j (n 0; pat 0; act 0) 2 FT and pat 6= pat 0jg
S(: : : ;FT ; : : : ; fjFlowMod Del pat jg ] inm ; )  ! S(: : : ;FT rem; : : : ; inm ; )
(Del)
pt 2 pts
S( ; pts; : : : ; outp ; fjPktOut pt pkjg ] inm ; )  ! S( ; pts; : : : ; fj(pt; pk)jg ] outp ; inm ; )
(PktOut)
fout() (sw ;SM ; 0)
C(; ; ) jM(sw ;SMS ; )  ! C(0; ; ) jM(sw ; [SM ] ++SMS ; ) (Ctrl-Send)
fin(sw ; ;CM ) 0
C(; fin ; ) jM(sw ; ;CMS ++ [CM ])  ! C(0; fin ; ) jM(sw ; ;CMS )
(Ctrl-Recv)
SM 6= BarrierRequest n
M(sw ;SMS ++ [SM ] ; ) j S(sw ; : : : ; inm ; )  !M(sw ;SMS ; ) j S(sw ; : : : ; fjSM jg ] inm ; )
(Switch-Recv-Ctrl)
M(sw ;SMS ++ [BarrierRequest n] ; ) j S(sw ; : : : ; fjjg; outm)
 ! M(sw ;SMS ; ) j S(sw ; : : : ; fjjg; fjBarrierReply njg ] outm)
(Switch-Recv-Barrier)
S(sw ; : : : ; fjCM jg ] outm) jM(sw ; ;CMS )  ! S(sw ; : : : ; outm) jM(sw ; ; [CM ] ++CMS )
(Switch-Send-Ctrl)
Sys1  ! Sys01
Sys1 j Sys2  ! Sys01 j Sys2
(Congruence)
Figure 4.8: Featherweight OpenFlow semantics.
(informal) models [52, 49, 14]. We believe Featherweight OpenFlow could also serve as a
foundation for these tools.
4.6.1 OpenFlow Semantics
Initially, every switch has an empty flow table that diverts all packets to the controller. Using
FlowMod messages, the controller can insert new table entries to have the switch process
packets itself. A non-trivial program may compile to several thousand flow table entries, but
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FlowMod messages only add a single entry at a time. In general, many FlowMod messages
will be needed to fully configure a switch. However, OpenFlow is designed to give switches
a lot of latitude to enable eﬃcient processing, often at the expense of programmability and
understandability:
 Pattern semantics. As discussed in preceding sections, the semantics of flow tables
is non-trivial: patterns have implicit dependencies and flow tables can have multiple,
overlapping entries. (The OpenFlow specification itself notes that scanning the table
to find overlaps is expensive.) Therefore, it is up to the controller to avoid overlaps
that introduce non-determinism.
 Packet reordering. Switches may reorder packets arbitrarily. For example, switches
often have both a “fast path” that uses custom packet-processing hardware and a “slow
path” that processes packets using a slower general-purpose CPU.
 No acknowledgments. Switches do not acknowledge when FlowMod messages are
processed, except when errors occur. The controller can explicitly request acknowledg-
ments by sending a barrier request after a FlowMod. When the switch has processed
the FlowMod (and all other messages received before the barrier request), it responds
with a barrier reply.
 Control message reordering. Switches may process control messages, including
FlowMod messages, in any order. This is based on the architecture of switches, where
the logical flow table is implemented by multiple physical tables working in parallel—
each physical table typically only matches headers for one protocol. To process a rule
with a pattern such as fnwSrc = 10.0.0.1;dlTyp = 0x800g, which matches headers
across several protocols, several physical tables may need to be reconfigured, which
takes longer to process than a simple pattern such as fdlDst = H2g.
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Figure 4.8 defines the syntax and semantics of Featherweight OpenFlow, which faithfully
models all of these behaviors. The rest of this section discusses the key elements of the
model in detail.
4.6.2 Network Elements
Featherweight OpenFlow has four kinds of elements: switches, controllers, links between
switches (carrying data packets), and links between switches and the controller (carrying
OpenFlow messages). The semantics is specified using a small-step relation, with elements
interacting by passing messages and updating their state non-deterministically.
Switches. A switch S comprises a unique identifier sw , a set of ports pts , and input and
output packet buﬀers inp and outp . The buﬀers are multisets of packets tagged with ports,
(pt; pk). In the input buﬀer, packets are tagged with the port on which they were received.
In the output buﬀer, packets are tagged with the port on which they will be sent out. Since
buﬀers are unordered, switches can process packets in any order. Switches also have a flow
table, FT , which determines how the switch processes packets. As detailed in Section 4.4,
the table is a collection of flow table entries, where each entry has a priority, pattern and,
a multiset of output ports. Each switch also has a multiset of messages to and from the
controller, outm and inm . There are three kinds of messages from the controller:
 PktOut pt pk instructs the switch to emit packet pk on port pt.
 FlowMod  instructs the switch to add or delete entries from its flow table. When  is
Add n pat act , a new entry is created, whereas Del pat deletes all entries that match
pat exactly. In our model, we assume that flow tables on switches can be arbitrarily
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large. This is not the case for hardware switches, where the size of flow tables is often
constrained by the amount of silicon used, and varies from switch-to-switch. It would
be straightforward to modify our model to bound the size of the table on each switch.
 BarrierRequest n forces the switch to process all outstanding messages before reply-
ing with a BarrierReply n message.
Controllers. A controller C is defined by its local state , an input relation fin , and an
output relation fout . The local state and these relations are application-specific, so Feath-
erweight OpenFlow can be instantiated with any controller whose behavior can be modeled
in this way. The fout relation sends a message to a switch while fin receives a message from
a switch. Both relations update the state . There are two kinds of messages a switch can
send to the controller:
 PktIn pt pk indicates that packet pk was received on pt and did not match any entry
in the flow table.
 BarrierReply n indicates that sw has processed all messages up to and including a
BarrierRequest n sent earlier.
Data links. A data link L is a unidirectional queue of packets between two switch ports.
To model bidirectional links we use symmetric unidirectional links. Featherweight OpenFlow
does not model packet-loss in links and packet-buﬀers. It would be easy to extend our model
so that packets are lost, for example, with some probability. Without packet loss, a packet
traces paths from its source to its destinations (or loops forever). With packet loss, a packet
traces a prefix of the complete path given by our model under ideal conditions.
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Location loc ::= sw  pt
Located packet lp ::= loc  pk
Topology T 2 loc * loc
; T ` fjlpjg lp=) fjlpjg
lps 0 = fj(T (sw ; ptout); pk) j (ptout ; pk) 2 JK sw pt pkjg
; T ` fj((sw ; pt); pk)jg ] fjlp1    lpnjg
(sw ;pt;pk)
=====)
lps 0 ] fjlp1    lpnjg
Figure 4.9: Network semantics.
Control links. A control link M is a bidirectional link between the switch and the con-
troller that contains a queue of controller messages for the switch and a queue of switch
messages headed to the controller. Messages between the controller and the switch are sent
and delivered in order, but may be processed in any order.
4.7 Verified Run-Time System
So far, we have developed a semantics for NetCore (Section 4.3), a compiler from NetCore to
flow tables (Section 4.4), and a low-level semantics for OpenFlow (Section 4.6). To actually
execute NetCore programs, we also need to develop a run-time system that installs rules on
switches and prove it correct.
4.7.1 NetCore Run-Time System
There are many ways to build a controller that implements a NetCore run-time system. A
trivial solution is to simply process all packets on the controller. The controller receives
input packets as PktIn messages, evaluates them using the NetCore semantics, and emits
the outputs using PktOut messages.
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Of course, we can do much better by using the NetCore compiler to actually generate
flow tables and install those rules on switches using FlowMod messages. For example, given
the following program,
dlDst = H1 and not(dlTyp = 0x800)) fj1jg
the compiler might generate the following flow table,
Priority Pattern Action
5 fdlDst = H1;dlTyp = 0x800g fjjg
4 fdlDst = H1g fj1jg
3 ? fjjg
and the controller would emit three FlowMod messages:
Add 5 fdlDst = H1;dlTyp = 0x800g fjjg
Add 4 fdlDst = H1g fj1jg
Add 3 ? fjjg
However, it would be unsafe to emit just these messages. As discussed in Section 4.6, switches
can reorder messages to maximize throughput. This can lead to transient bugs by creating
intermediate flow tables that are inconsistent with the intended policy. For example, if
the Add 3 ? fjjg message is processed first, all packets will be dropped. Alternatively, if
Add 4 fdlDst = H1g fj1jg is processed first, traﬃc that should be dropped will be incorrectly
forwarded. Of the six possible permutations, only one has the property that all intermediate
states either (i) process packets according to the program, or (ii) send packets to the controller
(which can evaluate them using the program). Therefore, to ensure the switch processes
the messages in order, the run-time system must intersperse BarrierRequest messages
between FlowMod messages.
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Network semantics. The semantics of NetCore presented in Section 4.3 defines how a
program processes a single packet at a single switch at a time. But Featherweight OpenFlow
models the behavior of an entire network of switches with multiple packets in-flight. To
reconcile the diﬀerence between these two, we need a network semantics that models the
processing of all packets in the network. In this semantics (Fig. 4.9), the system state is a
multiset of in-flight located packets fjlpjg. At each step, the system:
1. Removes a located packet ((sw ; pt); pk) from its state,
2. Processes the packet according to the program to produce a new multiset of located
packets,
fjlp1    lpnjg = JK sw pt pk;
3. Transfers these packets to input ports, using the topology, T (lp1)   T (lpn), and
4. Adds the transferred packets to the system state.
Note that this approach to constructing a network semantics is not specific to NetCore:
any hop-by-hop packet processing function could be used. Below, we refer to any semantics
constructed in this way as a network semantics.
4.7.2 Run-Time System Correctness
Now we are ready to prove the correctness of the NetCore run-time system. However, rather
than proving this directly, we instead develop a general framework for establishing controller
correctness, and obtain the result for NetCore as a special case.
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Bisimulation equivalence. The inputs to our framework are: (i) the high-level, hop-by-
hop function the network is intended to implement, and (ii) the controller implementation,
which is required to satisfy natural safety and liveness conditions. Given these parameters, we
construct a weak bisimulation between the network semantics of the high-level function and
an OpenFlow network instantiated with the controller implementation. This construction
handles a number of low-level details once and for all, freeing developers to focus on essential
controller correctness properties.
We prove a weak (rather than strong) bisimulation2 because Featherweight OpenFlow
models the mechanics of packet processing in much greater detail than in the network se-
mantics. For example, consider a NetCore program that forwards a packet pk from one
switch to another, say S1 to S2, in a single step. An equivalent Featherweight OpenFlow
implementation would require at least three steps: (i) process pk at S1, move pk from the
input buﬀer to the output buﬀer, (ii) move pk from S1 ’s output buﬀer to the link to S2,
and (iii) move pk from the link to S2 ’s input buﬀer. If there were other packets on the link
(which is likely!), additional steps would be needed. Moreover, pk could take an even more
circuitous route if it is redirected to the controller.
The weak bisimulation states that the NetCore and Featherweight OpenFlow are indis-
tinguishable modulo internal steps. Hence, any reasoning about the trajectory of a packet
at the NetCore level will be preserved in Featherweight OpenFlow.
Observations. To define a weak bisimulation, we need a notion of observation (called an
action in the -calculus). We say that the NetCore network semantics observes a packet
2A weak bisimulation identifies states of two systems as equivalent modulo unobservable (internal) tran-
sitions. A strong bisimulation does not allow a system to perform unobservable transitions to catch up. For
example, a pipelined processor may split one logical operation into two steps, with an unobservable transition
between the processing of the steps. The pipelined processor would be weakly bisimilar to a processor that
performed the operation in one step, but not strongly bisimilar.
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(sw ; pt; pk) when it selects the packet from its state—i.e., just before evaluating it. Likewise,
a Featherweight OpenFlow program observes a packet (sw ; pt; pk) when it removes (pt; pk)
from the input buﬀer on sw to process it using the Fwd rule.
Bisimulation relation. Establishing a weak bisimulation requires exhibiting a relation
OF between the concrete and abstract states with certain properties. We relate packets
located in links and buﬀers in Featherweight OpenFlow to packets in the abstract network
semantics. We elide the full definition of the relation, but describe some of its key charac-
teristics:
 Packets (pt; pk) in input buﬀers inp on sw are related to packets ((sw ; pt); pk) in the
abstract state.
 Packets (pt; pk) in output buﬀers outp on sw are related to packets located at the other
side of the link connected to pt.
 Likewise, packets on a data link (or contained in PktOut messages) are related to
packets located at the other side of the data link (or the link connected to the port in
the message).
Intuitively, packets in output buﬀers have already been processed and observed. The network
semantics moves packets to new locations in one step whereas OpenFlow requires several
more steps, but we must not be able to observe these intermediate steps. Therefore, after
Featherweight OpenFlow observes a concrete packet pk (in the Fwd rule), subsequent copies
of pk must be related to packets at the ultimate destination.
The structure of the relation is largely straightforward and dictated by the nature of
Featherweight OpenFlow. However, a few parts are application specific. In particular,
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packets at the controller and packets sent to the controller in PktIn messages may relate to
the state in the network semantics in application-specific ways.
Abstract semantics. So far, we have focused on NetCore to build intuitions. But our
bisimulation can be obtained for any controller that implements a high-level packet-processing
function. We now make this precise with a few additional definitions.
Definition 2 (Abstract Semantics). An abstract semantics is defined by the following com-
ponents:
1. An abstract packet-processing function on located packets:
f(lp) = fjlp1    lpnjg
2. An abstraction function, c :  ! fjlpjg, that identifies the packets the controller has
received but not yet processed.
Note that the type of the NetCore semantics (Fig. 4.9) matches the type of the function
above. In addition, because the NetCore controller simply holds the multiset of PktIn
messages, the abstraction function is trivial. Given such an abstract semantics, we can lift
it to a network semantics lp=) as we did for NetCore.
We say that an abstract semantics is compatible with a concrete controller implementa-
tion, consisting of a type of controller state , and input and output relations fin and fout ,
if the two satisfy the following conditions relating their behavior:
Definition 3 (Compatibility). An abstract semantics and controller implementation are
compatible if:
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1. The controller ensures that all times packets are either (i) processed by switches in ac-
cordance with the packet-processing function or (ii) sent to the controller for processing;
2. Whenever the controller receives a packet,
(sw ;PktIn pt pk; ) 0
it applies the packet-processing function f to pk to get a multiset of located packets and
adds them to its state
c(0) = c() ] f(pk)
3. Whenever the controller emits a packet,
  (sw ;PktOut pt pk; 0)
it removes the packet from its state:
c(0) = c() n fj(sw ; pt; pk)jg
4. The controller eventually processes all packets (sw ; pt; pk) in its state c() according to
the packet-processing function, and
5. The controller eventually processes all OpenFlow messages.
The first property is essential. If it did not hold, switches could process packets contrary to
the intended packet-processing relation. Proving it requires reasoning about the messages
sent to the switches by the controller. In particular, because switches may reorder messages,
barriers must be interspersed appropriately. The second and third properties relate the
abstraction function c and the controller implementation. The fourth property requires
the controller to correctly process every packet it receives. The fifth property is a liveness
condition requiring the controller to eventually process every OpenFlow message. This holds
in the absence of failures on the control link and the controller itself.
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Given such a semantics, we show that our relation between abstract and Featherweight
OpenFlow states and its inverse are weak simulations. This implies that the relation is a
weak bisimulation, and thus that the two systems are weakly bisimilar.
Theorem 8 (Weak Bisimulation). For all compatible abstract semantics and controller im-
plementations, all Featherweight OpenFlow states s and s0, and all abstract states t and
t0:
 If s OF t and s (sw ;pt;pk)     ! s0, then there exists an abstract network state t00 such that
t
(sw ;pt;pk)
=====) t00 and s0 OF t00, and
 If s OF t and t (sw ;pt;pk)=====) t0, then there exists a Featherweight OpenFlow state s00, and
abstract network states si; s0i such that
s  ! si (sw ;pt;pk)     ! s0i  ! s00
and s00 OF t0.
In this theorem, portions of the OF relation are defined in terms of the controller abstraction
function, c supplied as a parameter. In addition, the proofs themselves rely on compatibility
(Definition 3).
Finally, we instantiate this theorem for the NetCore controller:
Corollary 2 (NetCore Run-Time Correctness). The network semantics of NetCore is weakly
bisimilar to the concrete semantics of the NetCore controller in Featherweight OpenFlow.
4.8 Implementation and Evaluation
We have built a complete working implementation of the system described in this chapter,
including machine-checked proofs of each of the lemmas and theorems. Our implementation
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is available under an open-source license at the following URL:
http://frenetic-lang.org
Our system consists of 12 KLOC of Coq, which we extract to OCaml and link against two
unverified components:
 A library to serialize OpenFlow data types to the OpenFlow wire format. This code is
a lightly modified version of the Mirage OpenFlow library [63] (1.4K LOC).
 A module to translate between the full OpenFlow protocol and the fragment used in
Featherweight OpenFlow (200 LOC).
We have deployed our NetCore controllers on real hardware and used them to build a number
of useful network applications including host discovery, shortest-path routing, spanning tree,
access control, and traﬃc monitoring. Using the union operator, it is easy to compose these
modules with others to form larger applications.
Controller throughput. Controller throughput is important for the performance of sdns.
The CBench [98] tool quantifies controller throughput by flooding the controller with PktIn
messages and measuring the time taken to receive PktOut messages in response. This is a
somewhat crude metric, but it is still eﬀective, since any controller must respond to PktIn
messages. We used CBench to compare the throughput of our verified controller with our
previous unverified NetCore controller, written in Haskell, and with the popular POX and
NOX controllers, written in Python and C++ respectively. To ensure that the experiment
tested throughput and not the application running on it, we had each controller execute a
trivial program that floods all packets. We ran the experiment on a dual-core 3.3 GHz Intel
i3 with 8GB RAM with Ubuntu 12.04 and obtained the results shown in Fig. 4.10 (a).
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Controller Msgs/sec
Unverified NetCore 26,022
NOX 16,997
Verified NetCore 9,437
POX 6,150
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Figure 4.10: Experiments: (a) controller throughput results; (b) control traﬃc topology; (c)
control traﬃc results.
Our unverified NetCore controller is significantly faster than our verified controller. We
attribute this to (i) a more mature backend that uses an optimized library from Nettle [103] to
serialize messages, and (ii) Haskell’s superior multicore support, which the controller exploits
heavily. However, despite being slower than the original NetCore, the new controller is still
fast enough to be useful—indeed, it is faster than the popular POX controller (although POX
is not tuned for performance). We plan to optimize our controller to improve its performance
in the future.
Control traﬃc. Another key factor that aﬀects sdn performance is the amount of traﬃc
that the controller must handle. This metric measures the eﬀectiveness of the controller at
compiling, optimizing, and installing forwarding rules rather than processing packets itself.
To properly assess a controller on these points, we need a more substantial application than
“flood all packets.” Using NetCore, we built an application that computes shortest path
forwarding rules as well as a spanning tree for broadcast. We ran this program on the six-
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switch Waxman topology shown in Fig. 4.10 (b), with two hosts connected to each switch.
In the experiment, every host sent 10 icmp (ping) broadcast packets along the span-
ning tree, and received the replies from other hosts along shortest path routes. We used
Mininet [37] to simulate the network and collected traﬃc traces using tcpdump. The total
amount of network traﬃc during the experiment was 372 Kb.
We compared our Verified NetCore controller to several others: a (verified) “PacketOut”
controller that never installs forwarding rules and processes all packets itself; our previous
“Unverified NetCore” controller, written in Haskell; and a reactive “MicroFlow” controller [24]
written in Haskell. The results of the experiment are shown in Fig. 4.10 (c). The graphs plot
time-series data for every controller, showing the amount of control traﬃc in each one-second
interval. Note that the y axis is on a logarithmic scale.
In the plot for our Verified NetCore controller, there is a large spike in control traﬃc at
the start of the experiment, where the controller sends messages to install the forwarding
rules generated from the program. Additional control traﬃc appears every 15 seconds; these
messages implement a simple keep-alive protocol between the controller and switches. The
Unverified NetCore controller uses the same compilation and run-time system algorithms
as our verified controller, so its plot is nearly identical. The MicroFlow controller installs
individual fine-grained rules in response to individual traﬃc flows rather than proactively
compiling complete flow tables. Accordingly, its plot shows that there is much more control
traﬃc than for the two NetCore controllers. The graph shows how traﬃc spikes when multiple
hosts respond simultaneously to an icmp broadcast. The fourth plot shows the behavior of
the PacketOut controller. Because this controller does not install any forwarding rules on
the switches, all data traﬃc flows to the controller and then back into the network.
Although these results are preliminary, we believe they demonstrate that the performance
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of our verified NetCore controller can be competitive with other controllers. In particular,
our verified controller generates the same flow tables and handles a similar amount of traﬃc
as the earlier unverified NetCore controller, which was written in Haskell. Moreover, our
system is not tuned for performance. As we optimize and extend our system, we expect that
its performance will only improve.
4.9 Conclusions
This chapter presented a formal foundation for network reasoning: a detailed model of
OpenFlow, formalized in the Coq proof assistant, and a machine-verified compiler and run-
time system for the NetCore programming language. The main result is a general framework
for establishing controller correctness that reduces the proof obligation to a small number of
safety and liveness properties.
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CHAPTER 5
REASONING ABOUT NETWORK UPDATES
“Nothing endures but change.”
—Heraclitus
In this chapter, we show how to move a network between diﬀerent configurations in such
a way that the network preserves the behavior of the configurations, even while it is in
transition. We present network update abstractions, implementations and optimizations of
those abstractions, and a formal model of updates in software-defined networks to formally
specify our abstractions and prove them correct.
The work in this chapter is based upon a 2012 SIGCOMM paper [87] written with Nate
Foster, Jennifer Rexford, Cole Schlesinger, and David Walker.
5.1 Introduction
The techniques in the previous chapters show how to take a network specification and a net-
work program, and build a system that provably satisfies the specification. But real-world
networks exist in a constant state of flux. Operators frequently modify routing tables and
change access control lists to perform tasks from planned maintenance, to traﬃc engineering,
to patching security vulnerabilities, to migrating virtual machines in a datacenter. Simply
implementing a single network program correctly is not suﬃcient: we need to update the net-
work program over time in response to changes in the network, and still maintain invariants,
even while updates are in progress.
But network updates are diﬃcult to perform correctly: even when planned well in advance
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Example Application Policy Change Desired Property Practical Implications
Stateless firewall Changing access control list No security holes Admitting malicious traﬃc
Planned maintenance [28, 85] Shut down a node/link No loops/blackholes Packet/bandwidth loss
Traﬃc engineering [27, 85] Changing a link weight No loops/blackholes Packet/bandwidth loss
VM migration [19] Move server to new location No loops/blackholes Packet/bandwidth loss
IGP migration [102] Adding route summarization No loops/blackholes Packet/bandwidth loss
Traﬃc monitoring Changing traﬃc partitions Consistent counts Inaccurate measurements
Server load balancing [39, 105] Changing load distribution Connection aﬃnity Broken connections
NAT or stateful firewall Adding/replacing equipment Connection aﬃnity Outages, broken connections
Table 5.1: Example changes to network configuration, and the desired update properties.
they can result in disruptions such as transient outages, lost server connections, unexpected
security vulnerabilities, hiccups in VoIP calls, or the death of a player’s favorite character in
an online game.
To address these problems, researchers have proposed a number of extensions to protocols
and operational practices that aim to prevent transient anomalies [29, 28, 45, 85, 102].
However, each of these solutions is limited to a specific protocol (e.g., OSPF and BGP)
and a specific set of properties (e.g., freedom from loops and blackholes) and increases the
complexity of the system considerably. Hence, in practice, network operators have little help
when designing a new protocol or trying to ensure an additional property not covered by
existing techniques. A list of example applications and their properties is summarized in
Table 5.1.
Instead of relying on point solutions for network updates, this chapter presents foun-
dational principles for designing solutions that are applicable to a wide range of protocols
and properties. These solutions come with two parts: (1) an abstract interface that oﬀers
strong, precise, and intuitive semantic guarantees, and (2) concrete mechanisms that faith-
fully implement the semantics specified in the abstract interface. Programmers can use the
interface to build robust applications on top of a reliable foundation. The mechanisms, while
possibly complex, should be implemented once by experts, tuned and optimized, and used
86
over and over, much like register allocation or garbage collection in a high-level programming
language.
Instead of requiring SDN programmers to implement configuration changes using today’s
low-level interfaces, our high-level, abstract operations allow the programmer to update the
configuration of the entire network in one fell swoop. The libraries implementing these
abstractions provide strong semantic guarantees about the observable eﬀects of the global
updates, and handle all of the details of transitioning between old and new configurations
eﬃciently.
Abstractions Our central abstraction is per-packet consistency, the guarantee that every
packet traversing the network is processed by exactly one consistent global network config-
uration. When a network update occurs, this guarantee persists: each packet is processed
either using the configuration in place prior to the update, or the configuration in place after
the update, but never a mixture of the two. Note that this consistency abstraction is more
powerful than an “atomic” update mechanism that simultaneously updates all switches in
the network. Such a simultaneous update could easily catch many packets in flight in the
middle of the network, and such packets may wind up traversing a mixture of configurations,
causing them to be dropped or sent to the wrong destination. We also introduce per-flow
consistency, a generalization of per-packet consistency that guarantees all packets in the
same flow are processed with the same configuration. This stronger guarantee is needed in
applications such as HTTP load balancers, which need to ensure that all packets in the same
TCP connection reach the same server replica to avoid breaking connections.
To support these abstractions, we develop several update mechanisms that use features
commonly available on OpenFlow switches. Our most general mechanism, which enables
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transition between any two configurations, performs a two-phase update of the rules in the
new configuration onto the switches. The other mechanisms are optimizations that achieve
better performance under circumstances that arise often in practice. These optimizations
transition to new configurations in less time, update fewer switches, or fewer rules.
To analyze our abstractions and mechanisms, we develop a simple, formal model that
captures the essential features of OpenFlow networks. This model allows us to define a class
of network properties, called trace properties, that characterize the paths individual packets
take through the network. The model also allows us to prove a remarkable result: if any
trace property P holds of a network configuration prior to a per-packet consistent update
as well as after the update, then P also holds continuously throughout the update process.
This illustrates the true power of our abstractions: programmers do not need to specify
which trace properties our system must maintain during an update, because a per-packet
consistent update preserves all of them! For example, if the old and new configurations are
free from forwarding loops, then the network will be loop-free before, during, and after the
update. In addition to the proof sketch included in this chapter, this result has been formally
verified in the Coq proof assistant [9].
An important and useful corollary of these observations is that it is possible to take any
verification tool that checks trace properties of static network configurations and transform
it into a tool that checks invariance of trace properties as the network configurations evolve
dynamically—it suﬃces to check the static policies before and after the update. Indeed, the
techniques and systems in the previous chapter all verify trace properties of static configu-
rations, dovetailing perfectly with the developments here.
Contributions This chapter makes the following contributions:
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 Update abstractions: We propose per-packet and per-flow consistency as canonical,
general abstractions for specifying network updates (Sections 5.2 and 5.6).
 Update mechanisms: We describe OpenFlow-compatible implementation mecha-
nisms and several optimizations tailored to common scenarios (Sections 5.5 and 5.8).
 Theoretical model: We develop a mathematical model that captures the essential
behavior of SDNs, and we prove that the mechanisms correctly implement the abstrac-
tions (Section 5.3). We have formalized the model and proved the main theorems in
the Coq proof assistant.
 Implementation: We describe a prototype implementation on top of the Open-
Flow/NOX platform (Section 5.8).
 Experiments: We present results from experiments run on small, but canonical ap-
plications that compare the total number of control messages and rule overhead needed
to implement updates in each of these applications (Section 5.8).
5.2 Example
To illustrate the challenges surrounding network updates, consider an example network with
one ingress switch I and three “filtering” switches FW1, FW2, and FW3, each sitting between
I and the rest of the Internet, as shown on the left side of Figure 5.1. Several classes of traﬃc
are connected to I: untrustworthy packets from Unknown and Guest hosts, and trustworthy
packets from Student and Faculty hosts. At all times, the network should enforce a security
policy that denies SSH traﬃc from untrustworthy hosts, but allows all other traﬃc to pass
through the network unmodified. We assume that any of the filtering switches have the
capability to perform the requisite monitoring, blocking, and forwarding.
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F2
I
Internet
F1 F3
Configuration I
Type Action
I U;G Forward FW1
S Forward FW2
F Forward FW3
FW1 SSH Monitor
 Allow
FW2  Allow
FW3  Allow
Configuration II
Type Action
I U Forward FW1
G Forward FW2
S; F Forward FW3
FW1 SSH Monitor
 Allow
FW2 SSH Monitor
 Allow
FW3  Allow
Figure 5.1: Access control example.
There are several ways to implement this policy, and depending on the traﬃc load, one
may be better than another. Suppose that initially we configure the switches as shown in
the leftmost table in Figure 5.1: switch I sends traﬃc from U and G hosts to FW1, from S
hosts to FW2, and from F hosts to FW3. Switch FW1 monitors (and denies) SSH packets
and allows all other packets to pass through, while FW2 and FW3 simply let all packets pass
through.
Now, suppose the load shifts, and we need more resources to monitor the untrustworthy
traﬃc. We might reconfigure the network as shown in the table on the right of Figure 5.1,
where the task of monitoring traﬃc from untrustworthy hosts is divided between FW1 and
FW2, and all traﬃc from trustworthy hosts is forwarded to FW3. Because we cannot update
the network all at once, the individual switches need to be reconfigured one-by-one. However,
if we are not careful, making incremental updates to the individual switches can lead to
intermediate configurations that violate the intended security policy. For instance, if we
start by updating FW2 to deny SSH traﬃc, we interfere with traﬃc sent by trustworthy
hosts. If, on the other hand, we start by updating switch I to forward traﬃc according to the
new configuration (sending U traﬃc to FW1, G traﬃc to FW2, and S and F traﬃc to FW3),
then SSH packets from untrustworthy hosts will incorrectly be allowed to pass through the
network. There is one valid transition plan:
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1. Update I to forward S traﬃc to FW3, while continuing to forward U and G traﬃc to
FW1 and F traﬃc to FW3.
2. Wait until in-flight packets have been processed by FW2.
3. Update FW2 to deny SSH packets.
4. Update I to forward G traﬃc to FW2, while continuing to forward U traﬃc to FW1 and
S and F traﬃc to FW3.
But finding this ordering and verifying that it behaves correctly requires performing intricate
reasoning about a sequence of intermediate configurations—something that is tedious and
error-prone, even for this simple example. Even worse, in some examples it is impossible
to find an ordering that implements the transition simply by adding one part of the new
configuration at a time (e.g., if we swap the roles of FW1 and FW3 while enforcing the
intended security policy). In general, more powerful update mechanisms are needed.
Any energy the programmer devotes to navigating this space would be better spent in
other ways. The tedious job of finding a safe sequence of commands that implement an
update should be factored out, optimized, and reused across many applications. This is
the main achievement of this chapter. To implement the update using our abstractions, the
programmer would simply write:
per_packet_update(config2)
Here config2 represents the new global network configuration. The per-packet update li-
brary analyzes the configuration and topology and selects a suitable mechanism to implement
the update. Note that the programmer does not write any tricky code, does not need to con-
sider how to synchronize switch update commands, and does not need to consider the packets
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in flight across the network. The per packet update library handles all of the low-level
details, and even attempts to select a mechanism that minimizes the cost of implementing
the update.
To implement the update, the library could use the safe, switch-update ordering described
above. However, in general, it is not always possible to find such an ordering. Nevertheless,
one can always achieve a per-packet consistent update using a two-phase update supported
by configuration versioning. Intuitively, this universal update mechanism works by stamping
every incoming packet with a version number (e.g., stored in a VLAN tag) and modifying
every configuration so that it only processes packets with a set version number. To change
from one configuration to the next, it first populates the switches in the middle of the
network with new configurations guarded by the next version number. Once that is complete,
it enables the new configurations by installing rules at the perimeter of the network that
stamp packets with that next version number. Though this general mechanism is somewhat
heavyweight, our libraries identify and apply lightweight optimizations.
This short example illustrates some of the challenges that arise when implementing a
network update with strong semantic guarantees. However, it also shows that all of these
complexities can be hidden from the programmer, leaving only the simplest of interfaces for
global network update. We believe this simplicity will lead to a more reliable and secure
network infrastructure. The following sections describe our approach in more detail.
5.3 The Network Model
This section presents a simple mathematical model of the essential features of SDNs. This
model is defined by a relation that describes the fine-grained, step-by-step execution of a
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Bit b ::= 0 j 1
Packet pk ::= [b1; : : : ; bk]
Port p ::= 1 j    j k j Drop jWorld
Located Pkt lp ::= (p; pk)
Trace t ::= [lp1; : : : ; lpn]
Update u 2 LocatedPkt * LocatedPkt list
Switch Func: S 2 LocatedPkt ! LocatedPkt list
Topology Func: T 2 Port ! Port
Port Queue Q 2 Port ! (Packet  Trace) list
Conguration C ::= (S; T )
Network State N ::= (Q;C)
(a)
T-Process
if p is any port (1)
and Q(p) = [(pk1; t1); (pk2; t2); : : : ; (pkj; tj)] (2)
and C = (S; T ) (3)
and S(p; pk1) = [(p01; pk01); : : : ; (p0k; pk0k)] (4)
and T (p0i) = p00i ; for i from 1 to k (5)
and t01 = t1 ++ [(p; pk1)] (6)
and Q00 = override(Q; p 7! [(pk2; t2); : : : ; (pkj; tj)]) (7)
and Q01 = override(Q00; p001 7! Q(p001) ++ [(pk01; t01)])
...
and Q0k = override(Q0k 1; p00k 7! Q(p00k) ++ [(pk0k; t01)])
then (Q;C)  ! (Q0k; C) (8)
T-Update
if S 0 = override(S; u) (9)
then (Q; (S; T )) u ! (Q; (S 0; T )) (10)
(b)
Figure 5.2: The network model: (a) syntax and (b) semantics.
network. We write the relation using the notation N us !?N 0, where N is the network at the
beginning of an execution, N 0 is the network after some number of steps of execution, and
us is a list of “observations” that are made during the execution.1 Intuitively, an observation
should be thought of as a message between the controller and the network. In this chapter,
we are interested in a single kind of message—a message u that directs a particular switch
in the network to update its forwarding table with some new rules. The formal system could
easily be augmented with other kinds of observations, such as topology changes or failures.
For the sake of brevity, we elide these features in this chapter.
The main purpose of the model is to compute the traces, or paths, that a packet takes
through a network that is configured in a particular way. These traces in turn define the
properties, be they access control or connectivity or others, that a network configuration
satisfies. Our end goal is to use this model and the traces it generates to prove that, when
we update a network, the properties satisfied by the initial and final configurations are
preserved. The rest of this section will make these ideas precise.
Notation We use standard notation for types. In particular, the type T1 ! T2 denotes
the set of total functions that take arguments of type T1 and produce results of type T2,
while T1 * T2 denotes the set of partial functions from T1 to T2; the type T1  T2 denotes
the set of pairs with components of type T1 and T2; and T list denotes the set of lists with
elements of type T .
We also use standard notation to construct tuples: (x1; x2) is a pair of items x1 and x2.
For lists, we use the notation [x1; : : : ; xn] for the list of n elements x1 through xn, [ ] for the
empty list, and xs1 ++ xs2 for the concatenation of the two lists xs1 and xs2. Notice that
1When a network takes a series of steps and there are no observations (i.e., no updates happen), we omit
the list above the arrow, writing N  !?N 0 instead.
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if x is some sort of object, we will typically use xs as the variable for a list of such objects.
For example, we use u to represent a single update and us to represent a list of updates.
Basic Structures Figure 5.2(a) defines the syntax of the elements of the network model.
A packet pk is a sequence of bits, where a bit b is either 0 or 1. A port p represents a location
in the network where packets may be waiting to be processed. We distinguish two kinds
of ports: ordinary ports numbered uniquely from 1 to k, which correspond to the physical
input and output ports on switches, and two special ports, Drop and World . Intuitively,
packets queued at the Drop port represent packets that have been dropped, while packets
queued at the World port represent packets that have been forwarded beyond the confines
of the network. Each ordinary port will be located on some switch in the network. However,
we will leave the mapping from ports to switches unspecified, as it is not needed for our
primary analyses.
Switch and Topology Functions A network is a packet processor that forwards packets
and optionally modifies the contents of those packets on each hop. Following Kazemian
et al. [49], we model packet processing as the composition of two simpler behaviors: (1)
forwarding a packet across a switch and (2) moving packets from one end of a link to the
other end. The switch function S takes a located packet lp (a pair of a packet and a port)
as input and returns a list of located packets as a result. In many applications, a switch
function only produces a single located packet, but in applications such as multicast, it may
produce several. To drop a packet, a switch function maps the packet to the special Drop
port. The topology function T maps one port to another if the two ports are connected by
a link in the network. Given a topology function T , we define an ordinary port p to be an
ingress port if for all other ordinary ports p0 we have T (p0) 6= p. Similarly, we define an
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ordinary port p to be an internal port if it is not an ingress port.
To ensure that switch and topology functions are reasonable, we impose the following
conditions:
(1) For all packets pk, S(Drop; pk) = [(Drop; pk)] and
S(World ; pk) = [(World ; pk)];
(2) T (Drop) = Drop and T (World) = World ; and
(3) For all ports p and packets pk
if S(p; pk) = [(p1; pk1); : : : ; (pk; pkk)] we have k  1.
Taken together, the first and second conditions state that once a packet is dropped or
forwarded beyond the perimeter of the network, it must stay dropped or beyond the perimeter
of the network and never return. If our network forwards a packet out to another network
and that other network forwards the packet back to us, we treat the return packet as a “fresh”
packet—i.e., we do not explicitly model inter-domain forwarding. The third condition states
that applying the forwarding function to a port and a packet must produce at least one
packet. This third condition means that the network cannot drop a packet simply by not
forwarding it anywhere. Dropping packets occurs by explicitly forwarding a single packet
to the Drop port. This feature makes it possible to state network properties that require
packets either be dropped or not.
Configurations and Network States A trace t is a list of located packets that keeps
track of the hops that a packet takes as it traverses the network. A port queue Q is a total
function from ports to lists of packet-trace pairs. These port queues record the packets
waiting to be processed at each port in the network, along with the full processing history
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of that packet. Several of our definitions require modifying the state of a port queue. We
do this by building a new function that overrides the old queue with a new mapping for one
of its ports: override(Q; p 7! l) produces a new port queue Q0 that maps p to l and like Q
otherwise.
override(Q; p 7! l) = Q0
where Q0(p0) =
8>><>>:
l if p = p0
Q(p0) otherwise
A configuration C comprises a switch function S and a topology function T . A network state
N is a pair (Q;C) containing a port queue Q and configuration C.
Transitions The formal definition of the network semantics is given by the relations defined
in Figure 5.2(b), which describe how the network transitions from one state to the next
one. The system has two kinds of transitions: packet-processing transitions and update
transitions. In a packet-processing transition, a packet is retrieved from the queue for some
port, processed using the switch function S and topology function T , and the newly generated
packets are enqueued onto the appropriate port queues. More formally, packet-processing
transitions are defined by the T-Process case in Figure 5.2(b). Lines 1-8 may be read
roughly as follows:
(1) If p is any port,
(2) a list of packets is waiting on p,
(3) the configuration C is a pair of a switch function S and topology function T ,
(4) the switch function S forwards the chosen packet to a single output port, or several
ports in the case of multicast, and possibly modifies the packet
(5) the topology function T connects each output port to an input port,
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(6) a new trace t01, which extends the old trace and records the current hop, is generated,
(7) a new queue Q0k is generated by moving packets across links as specified in steps (4),
(5) and (6),
(8) then (Q;C) can step to (Q0k; C).
In an update transition, the switch forwarding function is updated with new behavior. We
represent an update u as a partial function from located packets to lists of located packets
(i.e., an update is just a “part” of a global (distributed) switch function). To apply an update
to a switch function, we overwrite the function using all of the mappings contained in the
update. More formally, override(S; u) produces a new function S 0 that behaves like u on
located packets in the domain2 of u, and like S otherwise.
override(S; u) = S 0
where S 0(p; pk) =
8>><>>:
u(p; pk) if (p; pk) 2 dom(u)
S(p; pk) otherwise
Update transitions are defined formally by the T-Update case in Figure 5.2(b). Lines 9-10
may be read as follows: if S 0 is obtained by applying update u to a switch in the network
then network state (Q; (S; T )) can step to new network state (Q; (S 0; T )).
Network Semantics The overall semantics of a network in our model is defined by allow-
ing the system to take an arbitrary number of steps starting from an initial state in which
the queues of all internal ports as well as World and Drop are empty, and the queues of ex-
ternal ports are filled with pairs of packets and the empty trace. The reflexive and transitive
closure of the single-step transition relation N us !?N 0 is defined in the usual way, where
the sequence of updates recorded in the label above the arrow is obtained by concatenating
2Domain of an update is the set of located packets it’s defined upon.
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all of the updates in the underlying transitions in order.3 A network generates a trace t if
and only if there exists an initial state Q such that (Q;C)  !?(Q0; C) and t appears in Q0.
Note that no updates may occur when generating a trace.
Properties In general, there are myriad properties a network might satisfy—e.g., access
control, connectivity, in-order delivery, quality of service, fault tolerance, to name a few.
In this chapter, we will primarily be interested in trace properties, which are prefix-closed
sets of traces. Trace properties characterize the paths (and the state of the packet at each
hop) that an individual packet is allowed to take through the network. Many network
properties, including access control, connectivity, routing correctness, loop-freedom, correct
VLAN tagging, and waypointing can be expressed using trace properties. For example,
loop-freedom can be specified using a set that contain all traces except those in which some
ordinary port p appears twice. In contrast, timing properties and relations between multiple
packets including quality of service, congestion control, in-order delivery, or flow aﬃnity are
not trace properties.
We say that a port queue Q satisfies a trace property P if all of the traces that ap-
pear in Q also appear in the set P . Similarly, we say that a network configuration C
satisfies a trace property P if for all initial port queues Q and all (update-free) executions
(Q;C)  !?(Q0; C), it is the case that Q0 satisfies P .
3The semantics of the network is defined from the perspective of an omniscient observer, so there is an
order in which the steps occur.
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5.4 Per-Packet Abstraction
One reason that network updates are diﬃcult to get right is that they are a form of concurrent
programming. Concurrent programming is hard because programmers must consider the
interleaving of every operation in every thread and this leads to a combinatorial explosion
of possible outcomes—too many outcomes for most programmers to manage. Likewise,
when performing a network update, a programmer must consider the interleaving of switch
update operations with every kind of packet that might be traversing their network. Again,
the number of possibilities explodes.
Per-packet consistent updates reduce the number of scenarios a programmer must con-
sider to just two: for every packet, it is as if the packet flows through the network completely
before the update occurs, or completely after the update occurs.
One might be tempted to think of per-packet consistent updates as “atomic updates”,
but they are actually better than that. An atomic update would cause packets in flight to
be processed partly according to the configuration in place prior to the update, and partly
according to the configuration in place after the update. To understand what happens to
those packets (e.g., whether they get dropped), a programmer would have to reason about
every possible trace formed by concatenating a prefix generated by the original configuration
with a suﬃx generated by the new configuration.
Intuitively, per-packet consistency states that for a given packet, the traces generated
during an update come from the old configurations, or the new configuration, but not a
mixture of the two. In the formal definition of per-packet consistency, we introduce an
equivalence relation  on packets. We extend this equivalence relation to traces by con-
sidering two traces to be equivalent if the packets they contain are equivalent according to
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the  relation (similarly, we extend  to properties in the obvious way). We then require
that all traces generated during the update be equivalent to a trace generated by either the
initial or final configuration. For the rest of the chapter, when we say that  is an equiva-
lence relation on traces, we assume that it has been constructed like this. This specification
gives implementations of updates flexibility by allowing some minor, irrelevant diﬀerences to
appear in traces (where  defines the notion of irrelevance precisely). For example, we can
define a “version” equivalence relation that relates packets pk and pk0 which diﬀer only in
the value of their version tags. This relation will allow us to state that changes to version
tags performed by the implementation mechanism for per-packet update are irrelevant. In
other words, a per-packet mechanism may perform internal bookkeeping by stamping version
tags without violating our technical requirements on the correctness of the mechanism. The
precise definition of per-packet consistency is as follows.
Definition 4 (Per-packet -consistent update). Let  be a trace-equivalence relation. An
update sequence us is a per-packet -consistent update from C1 to C2 if and only if, for all
 initial states Q,
 executions (Q;C1) us !?(Q0; C2),
 and traces t in Q0,
there exists
 an initial state Qi,
 and either an execution (Qi; C1)  !?(Q00; C1) or an execution (Qi; C2)  !?(Q00; C2),
such that Q00 contains t0, for some trace t0 with t0  t.
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From an implementer’s perspective, the operational definition of per-packet consistency
given above provides a specification that he or she must meet. However, from a program-
mer’s perspective, there is another, more useful side to per-packet consistency: per-packet
consistent updates preserve every trace property.
Definition 5 (-property preservation). Let C1 and C2 be configurations and  be a trace-
equivalence relation. A sequence us is a -property-preserving update from C1 and C2 if and
only if, for all
 initial states Q,
 executions (Q;C1) us !?(Q0; C2),
 and properties P that are satisfied by C1 and C2 and do not distinguish traces related
by ,
we have that Q0 satisfies P .
Universal -property preservation gives programmers a strong principle they can use to
reason about their programs. If programmers check that a trace property such as loop-
freedom or access control holds of the network configurations before and after an update,
they are guaranteed it holds of every trace generated throughout the update process, even
though the series of observations us may contain many discrete update steps. Our main
theorem states that per-packet consistent updates preserve all properties:
Theorem 1. For all trace-equivalence relations , if us is a per-packet -consistent update
of C1 to C2 then us is a -property-preserving update of C1 to C2.
The proof of the theorem is a relatively straightforward application of our definitions.
From a practical perspective, this theorem allows a programmer to get great mileage out of
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per-packet consistent updates. In particular, since per-packet consistent updates preserve all
trace properties, the programmers do not have to tell the system which specific properties
must be invariant in their applications.
From a theoretical perspective, it is also interesting that the converse of the above theo-
rem holds. This gives us a sort of completeness result: if programmers want an update that
preserves all properties, they need not search for it outside of the space of per-packet con-
sistent updates—any universal trace-property preserving update is a per-packet consistent
update.
Theorem 2. For all trace-equivalence relations , if us is a -property-preserving update
of C1 to C2 then us is a per-packet -consistent update of C1 to C2.
The proof of this theorem proceeds by observing that since us preserves all -properties,
it certainly preserves the following -property Por:
ft jthere exists an initial Q and a trace t0
and ((Q;C1)  !?(Q0; C1) or (Q;C2)  !?(Q0; C2));
and t  t0;
and t0 2 Q0g
By the definition of Por, the update us generates no traces that cannot be generated either
by the initial configuration C1 or by the final configuration C2. Hence, by definition, us is
per-packet consistent.
Formal proof The network model, and all of the above theorems have been formally
specified and proven in the Coq theorem prover.
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5.5 Per-packet Mechanisms
Depending on the network topology and the specifics of the configurations involved, there
may be several ways to implement a per-packet consistent update. However, all of the tech-
niques we have discovered so far, no matter how complicated, can be reduced to two funda-
mental building blocks: the one-touch update and the unobservable update. For example,
our two-phase update mechanism uses unobservable updates to install the new configuration
before it is used, and then “unlocks” the new policy by performing a one-touch update on
the ingress ports.
One-touch updates A one-touch update is an update with the property that no packet
can follow a path through the network that reaches an updated (or to-be-updated) part of
the switch rule space more than once.
Definition 6 (One-touch Update). Let C1 = (FT ; T ) be the original network configuration,
us = [u1; : : : ; uk] an update sequence, and C2 = (FT [u1; : : : ; uk]; T ) the new configuration,
such that the domains of each update u1 to uk are mutually disjoint. If, for all
 initial states Q,
 and executions (Q;C1) us !?(Q0; C2),
there does not exist a trace t in Q0 such that
 t contains distinct trace elements (p1; pk1) and (p2; pk2),
 and (p1; pk1) and (p2; pk2) both appear in the domain of update functions [u1; : : : ; uk],
then us is a one-touch update from C1 to C2.
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Theorem 9. If us is a one-touch update then us is a -per-packet consistent update for any
.
The proof proceeds by considering the possible traces t generated by an execution (Q;C1)
us !?(Q0; C2).
There are two cases: (1) There is no element of t that appears in the domain of an update
function in us , or (2) some element lp of t appears in the domain of an update function
in us . In case (1), t can also be generated by an execution with no update observations:
(Q;C1)  !?(Q00; C1), and the definition of per-packet consistency vacuously holds. In case
(2), there are two subcases:
(i) lp appears in the trace prior to the update taking place and so t is also generated by
(Q;C1)  !?(Q00; C1).
(ii) lp appears in the trace after the update has taken place and so t is also generated by
(Q;C2)  !?(Q00; C2).
The one-touch update mechanism has a few immediate, more specific applications:
 Loop-free switch updates: If a switch is not part of a topological loop (either before
or after the update), then updating all the ports on that switch is an instance of a
one-touch update and is per-packet consistent.
 Ingress port updates: An ingress port interfaces exclusively with the external world,
so it can not be a part of an internal topological loop and is never on the same trace
as any other ingress port. Consequently, any update to ingress ports is a one-touch
update and is per-packet consistent. Such updates can be used to change the admission
control policy for the network, either by adding or excluding flows.
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When one-touch updates are combined with unobservable updates, there are many more
possibilities.
Unobservable updates An unobservable update is an update that does not change the
set of traces generated by a network.
Definition 7 (Unobservable Update). Let C1= (FT ; T ) be the original network configura-
tion, us = [u1; : : : ; uk] an update sequence, and C2 = (FT [u1; : : : ; uk]; T ) the new configura-
tion. If, for all
 initial states Q,
 executions (Q;C1) us !?(Q0; C2),
 and traces t in Q0,
there exists
 an initial state Qi,
 and an execution (Qi; C1)  !?(Q00; C1),
such that the trace t is in Q00, then us is an unobservable update from C1 to C2.
Theorem 3. If us is an unobservable update then us is a per-packet consistent update.
The proof proceeds by observing that every trace generated during the unobservable
update (Q;C1)
us !?(Q0; C2) also appears in the traces generated by C1.
On their own, unobservable updates are useless as they do not change the semantics of
packet forwarding. However, they may be combined with other per-packet consistent updates
to great eﬀect using the following theorem.
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Theorem 10 (Composition). If us1 is an unobservable update from C1 to C2 and us2 is a
per-packet consistent update from C2 to C3 then us1 ++ us2 is a per-packet consistent update
from C1 to C3.
A simple use of composition arises when one wants to achieve a per-packet consistent
update that extends a policy with a completely new path.
 Path extension: Consider an initial configuration C1. Suppose [u1; u2; : : : ; uk] updates
ports p1; p2; : : : ; pk respectively to lay down a new path through the network with u1
updating the ingress port. Suppose also that the ports updated by us = [u2; : : : ; uk] are
unreachable in network configuration C1. Hence, us is an unobservable update. Since
[u1] updates an ingress port, it is a one-touch update and also per-packet consistent.
By the composition principle, us ++ [u1] is a per-packet consistent update.
Notice that the path update is achieved by first laying down rules on switches 2 to k
and then, when that is complete, laying down the rules on switch 1. A well-known (but
still common!) bug occurs when programmers attempt to install new forwarding paths but
lay down the elements of the path in wrong order [14]. Typically, there is a race condition
in which packets traverse the first link and reach the switch 2 before the program has had
time to lay down the rules on links 2 to k. Then when packets reach switch 2, it does not
yet know how to handle them, and a default rule sends the packets to the controller. The
controller often becomes confused as it begins to see additional packets that should have
already been dealt with by laying down the new rules. The underlying cause of this bug
is explained with our model—the programmer intended a per-packet consistent update of
the policy with a new path, but failed to implement per-packet consistency correctly. All
such bugs are eradicated from network programs if programmers use per-packet consistent
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updates and never use their own ad hoc update mechanisms.
Two-phase update So far, all of our update mechanisms have applied to special cases in
which the topology, existing configuration, and/or updates have specific properties. Fortu-
nately, provided there are a few bits in packets that are irrelevant to the network properties
a programmer wishes to enforce, and can be used for bookkeeping purposes, we can define a
mechanism that handles arbitrary updates using a two-phase update protocol.
Intuitively, the two-phase update works by first installing the new configuration on inter-
nal ports, but only enabling the new configuration for packets containing the correct version
number. It then updates the ingress ports one-by-one to stamp packets with the new version
number. Notice that the updates in the first phase are all unobservable, since before the
update, the ingress ports do not stamp packets with the new version number. Hence, since
updating ingress ports is per-packet consistent, by the composition principle, the two-phase
update is also per-packet consistent.
To define the two-phase update formally, we need a few additional definitions. Let a
version-property be a trace property that does not distinguish traces based on the value of
version tags. A configuration C is a version-n configuration if C = (S; T ) and S modifies
packets processed by any ingress port pin so that after passing through pin , the packet’s
version bit is n. We assume that the S function does not otherwise modify the version bit of
the packet. Two configurations C and C 0 coincide internally on version-n packets whenever
C = (S; T ) and C 0 = (S 0; T 0) and for all internal ports p, and for all packets pk with version
bit set to n, we have that FT (p; pk) = FT 0(p; pk). Finally, an update u is a refinement of
S, if for all located packets lp in the domain of u, we have that u(lp) = S(lp).
Definition 8 (Two-phase Update). Let C1 = (S; T ) be a version-1 configuration and C2 =
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(S 0; T ) be a version-2 configuration. Assume that C1 and C2 coincide internally on version-1
packets. Let us = [ui1; : : : ; uim; ue1; : : : ; uen] be an update sequence such that
 S 0 = override(S; us),
 each uij and uek is a refinement of S 0,
 p is internal, for each (p; pk) in the domain of uij,
 and p is an ingress, for each (p; pk) in the domain of uek.
Then us is a two-phase update from C1 to C2.
Theorem 11. If us is a two-phase update then us is per-packet consistent.
The proof simply observes that us1 = [ui1; : : : ; uim] is an unobservable update, and us2 =
[ue1; : : : ; u
e
n] is a one-touch update (and therefore per-packet consistent). Hence, by compo-
sition, the two-phase update us1 ++ us2 is per-packet consistent.
Optimized mechanisms Ideally, update mechanisms should satisfy update proportional-
ity, where the cost of installing a new configuration should be proportional to the size of
the configuration change. A perfectly proportional update would (un)install just the “delta”
between the two configurations. The full two-phase update mechanism that installs the full
new policy and then uninstalls the old policy lacks update proportionality. In this section,
we describe optimizations that substantially reduce overhead.
Pure extensions and retractions are one important case of updates where a per-packet
mechanism achieves perfect proportionality. A pure extension is an update that adds new
paths to the current configuration that cannot be reached in the old configuration—e.g.,
adding a forwarding path for a new host that comes online. Such updates do not require a
109
complete two-phase update, as only the new forwarding rules need to be installed—first at
the internal ports and then at the ingresses. The rules are installed using the current version
number. A pure retraction is the dual of a pure extension in which some paths are removed
from the configuration. Again, the paths being removed must be unreachable in the new
configuration. Pure retractions can be implemented by updating the ingresses, pausing to
wait until packets in flight drain out of the network, and then updating the internal ports.
If paths are not only added or removed but are modified then more powerful optimizations
are available. Per-packet consistency requires that the active paths in the network come from
either of the configurations. The subset mechanism works by identifying the paths that have
been added, removed or changed and then updating the rules along the entire path to use a
new version. This optimization is always applicable, but in the degenerate case it devolves
into a network-wide two-phase update.
5.6 Per-flow Consistency
Per-packet consistency, while simple and powerful, is not always enough. Some applications
require a stream of related packets to be handled consistently. For example, a server load-
balancer needs all packets from the same TCP connection to reach the same server replica.
In this section, we introduce the per-flow consistency abstraction, and discuss mechanisms
for per-flow consistent updates.
Per-flow abstraction To see the need for per-flow consistency, consider a network where
a single switch S load-balances between two back-end servers A and B. Initially, S directs
traﬃc from IP addresses starting with 0 (i.e., source addresses in 0.0.0.0/1) to A and 1 (i.e.,
source addresses in 128.0.0.0/1) to B. At some time later, we bring two additional servers C
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and D online, and re-balance the load using a two-bit prefix, directing traﬃc from addresses
starting with 00 to A, 01 to B, 10 to C, and 11 to D.
Intuitively, we want to process packets from new TCP connections according to the new
configuration. However, all packets in existing flows must go to the same server, where a
flow is a sequence of packets with related header fields, entering the network at the same
port, and not separated by more than n seconds. The particular value of n depends upon the
protocol and application. For example, the switch should send packets from a host whose
address starts with “11” to B, and not to D as the new configuration would dictate, if the
packets belong to an ongoing TCP connection. Simply processing individual packets with a
single configuration does not guarantee the desired behavior.
Per-flow consistency guarantees that all packets in the same flow are handled by the same
version of the configuration. Formally, the per-flow abstraction preserves all path properties,
as well as all properties that can be expressed in terms of the paths traversed by sets of
packets belonging to the same flow.
Per-flow mechanisms Implementing per-flow consistent updates is much more compli-
cated than per-packet consistency because the system must identify packets that belong to
active flows. Below, we discuss three diﬀerent mechanisms. Our system implements the
first of the three; the latter two, while promising, depend upon technology that is not yet
available in OpenFlow.
Switch rules with timeouts: A simple mechanism can be obtained by combining ver-
sioning with rule timeouts, similar to the approach in [105]. The idea is to pre-install the
new configuration on the internal switches, leaving the old version in place, as in per-packet
consistency. Then, on ingress switches, the controller sets soft timeouts on the rules for the
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old configuration and installs the new configuration at lower priority. When all flows match-
ing a given rule finish, the rule automatically expires and the rules for the new configuration
take eﬀect. When multiple flows match the same rule, the rule may be artificially kept alive
even though the “old” flows have all completed. If the rules are too coarse, then they may
never die! To ensure rules expire in a timely fashion, the controller can refine the old rules
to cover a progressively smaller portion of the flow space. However, “finer” rules require
more rules, a potentially scarce commodity. Managing the rules and dynamically refining
them over time can be a complex bookkeeping task, especially if the network undergoes a
subsequent configuration change before the previous one completes. However, this task can
be implemented and optimized once in a run-time system, and leveraged over and over again
in diﬀerent applications.
Wildcard cloning: An alternative mechanism exploits the wildcard clone feature of
the DevoFlow extension of OpenFlow [73]. When processing a packet with a clone rule, a
DevoFlow switch creates a new “microflow” rule that matches the packet header fields exactly.
In eﬀect, clone rules cause the switch to maintain a concrete representation of each active
flow. This enables a simple update mechanism: first, use clone rules whenever installing
configurations; second, to update from old to new, simply replace all old clone rules with
the new configuration. Existing flows will continue to be handled by the exact-match rules
previously generated by the old clone rules, and new flows will be handled by the new clone
rules, which themselves immediately spawn new microflow rules. While this mechanism
does not require complicated bookkeeping on the controller, it does require a more complex
switch.
End-host feedback: The third alternative exploits information readily available on the
end hosts, such as servers in a data center. With a small extension, these servers could
provide a list of active sockets (identified by the “five tuple” of IP addresses, TCP/UDP
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ports, and protocol) to the controller. As part of performing an update, the controller would
query the local hosts and install high-priority microflow rules that direct each active flow to
the assigned server replica. These rules could “timeout” after a period of inactivity, allowing
future traﬃc to “fall through” to the new configuration. Alternatively, the controller could
install “permanent” microflow rules, and explicitly remove them when the socket no long
exists on the host, obviating the need for any assumptions about the minimum interval time
between packets of the same connection.
5.7 Update Mechanisms
Ideally, update mechanisms should satisfy update proportionality, the where the cost of in-
stalling a new configuration should be proportional to the size of the configuration change.
A perfectly proportional update would (un)install just the “delta” between the two config-
urations. The full two-phase update mechanism that installs the full new policy and then
uninstalls the old policy lacks update proportionality. In this section, we describe optimiza-
tions that substantially reduce overhead.
Pure extensions and retractions are one important case of updates where a per-packet
mechanism achieves perfect proportionality. A pure extension is an update that adds new
paths to the current configuration that cannot be reached in the old configuration—e.g.,
adding a forwarding path for a new host that comes online. Such updates do not require a
complete two-phase update, as only the new forwarding rules need to be installed—first at
the internal ports and then at the ingresses. The rules are installed using the current version
number. A pure retraction is the dual of a pure extension in which some paths are removed
from the configuration. Again, the paths being removed must be unreachable in the new
configuration. Pure retractions can be implemented by updating the ingresses, pausing to
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wait until packets in flight drain out of the network, and then updating the internal ports.
If paths are not only added or removed but are modified then more powerful optimizations
than pure extension/retraction are available. Per-packet consistency requires that the active
paths in the network come from either of the configurations. There are two diﬀerent ways
to perform an update that maintains this promise. Either you identify the paths that have
been added, removed, or changed and you update the entire path to use a new version,
or you identify the switches that have changed and you update the entire switch to use
a new version. We call the former mechanism the “subset” mechanism and the latter the
“island” mechanism. Both of these mechanisms are always safe to apply but require analysis
on the configurations. In the degenerate case, these mechanisms devolve to a network-wide
two-phase update for all traﬃc.
Subset Mechanism The subset mechanism calculates the precise set of forwarding paths
aﬀected by an update and only updates the portion of the configuration that implements
those paths (using a standard two-phase update). In situations where the set of paths is
small compared to the size of the overall configuration, the cost of a subset update is less
than a full two-phase update. Unlike pure extensions and retractions, which do not handle
cases where existing forwarding paths are modified or where the aﬀected rules are reachable
in the new configuration, this mechanism can always be safely applied; in the case where
every rule is aﬀected by the update, it simply degenerates to a two-phase update.
The subset mechanism is implemented by computing the set of rules that changed in
the new configuration and computing the closure of that set under a certain connectivity
relation. We say that rules r1, r2 are connected under C = (S; T ) if there are packets pk,
pk0 and ports p; p0 such that r1((p; pk)) = [:::; (p0; pk0); :::] and (T (p0); pk0) 2 dom(r2). Write
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r1  C ! r2 if r1 is connected to r2 under C or vice versa.
Definition 9 (Subset Update). Let C = (S; T ) be a version-1 configuration and C 0 = (S 0; T )
be a version-2 configuration. Let mods0 = S 0 S, and let mods be the closure of mods0 under
the relation   C 0 ! . Then mods is a subset update from C to C 0.
Theorem 12. A subset update from C = (S; T ) to C 0 = (S 0; T ) is a per-packet consistent
update from C to C 0.
Proof Sketch: First show that if a set of rules is closed under the connectivity relation,
then there is a well-defined set of traces generated by that set of rules, and that set of traces
is equivalent to running the whole configuration over packets in the domain of the set. Then
show that S[mods] = S 0.
Island Mechanism The key idea behind the island mechanism is to identify a small
connected component of the network containing the switches whose configurations changed.
We update this “island” of switches to use the new configuration with a new version number.
The configurations use a new version when packets are sent between switches in the island
and restores the old version when packets leave the island. If more than two versions are
active in the network at a time then versions should be implemented with a mechanism that
supports a stack of versions. MPLS labels, available in OpenFlow 1.1 are a candidate.
The computation of an island update uses a closure computation similar to the subset
mechanism, except that the relation is over ports instead of rules. Say that two ports
p; p00 are connected under C = (S; T ) via a third port p0 if there exists a sequence of rules
r1; : : : ; rk; : : : rn such that r1 2 S[p], rk 2 S[p0], rn 2 S[p00] and for 0 < i < n, ri  C ! ri+1.
Write p C; p0 ! p00 if p; p00 are connected under C via p0.
115
E2 E3
A2
E1
A1
E6E4
A4
E5
A3
C1 C2
Figure 5.3: Fat tree topology
Definition 10 (Island Update). Let C = (S; T ) be a version-1 configuration and C 0 = (S 0; T )
be a version-2 configuration. Let mods0 = fp j p 2 S 0 Sg. Let mods be the least fixpoint of:
mods = fp j p 2 mods0g [ fp0 j 9p0; p00 2 mods: p0  C 0; p! p00g
Then mods is an island update from C to C 0.
5.7.1 Case Study
To highlight the uses and distinctions between the mechanisms, we work through case studies
of networks in a fat tree and a small-world topology.
We show a simple fat tree topology and a snippet of the routing configuration in Figure
5.3. The topology consists of edge switches E1-E6 directly connected to hosts on per-switch
subnets, aggregation switches A1-A4, and core switches C1-C2 providing connectivity be-
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Figure 5.4: Network before and after load balancing
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Figure 5.5: Island calculated for maintenance update
tween the two sides of the tree. The controller program runs a simple shortest path routing
algorithm and monitors the network to perform load balancing. In addition, the controller
takes certain switches down at predetermined times for scheduled maintenance.
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Dynamic Host When a host comes on or oﬄine at an edge switch, the routes for all the
other source-destination pairs remains unchanged. Consider a scenario in which a new host
H0 comes online at E1. Routes to and from H0 are installed at each switch, but existing rules
and traﬃc are unaﬀected. Using a full two-phase update requires updating the configuration
of every other switch, a gross violation of proportionality. Instead, the extension mechanism
installs just the new forwarding rules at the current version number and leaves the existing
rules untouched.
Network Load Balancing Initially, traﬃc between the two halves of the network is
statically split evenly between C1 and C2, but the dynamic traﬃc patterns may make this
static split unbalanced. Consider what happens if two pairs of hosts start sending heavy
traﬃc flows over C1’s link to A1, overloading it as shown in Figure 5.4. The controller
program moves to a new configuration that puts the traﬃc from one of these pairs onto
C2 to balance the load. Using a full update would require reinstalling all the rules in the
network at the new version, even rules independent of the change. The subset mechanism
instead updates just the rules involving the aﬀected pair of hosts.
Switch Maintenance For scheduled maintenance, the controller installs a configuration
that removes traﬃc from C1 and puts it all onto C2. The island mechanism recognizes that
the aggregation and core switches form a connected component that contains all switches
aﬀected by the update and restricts the update to just that subgraph of the network, shown
in Figure 5.5.
118
Application Toplogy Update 2PC Subset
Ops Max Overhead Ops Ops % Max Overhead
Routing Fat Tree Hosts 239830 92% 119003 50% 20%
Routes 266234 100% 123929 47% 10%
Both 239830 92% 142379 59% 20%
Waxman Hosts 273514 88% 136230 49% 66%
Routes 299300 90% 116038 39% 9%
Both 267434 91% 143503 54% 66%
Small World Hosts 320758 80% 158792 50% 30%
Routes 326884 85% 134734 41% 23%
Both 314670 90% 180121 57% 41%
Multicast Fat Tree Hosts 1043 100% 885 85% 100%
Routes 1170 100% 634 54% 57%
Both 1043 100% 949 91% 100%
Waxman Hosts 1037 100% 813 78% 100%
Routes 1132 85% 421 37% 50%
Both 1005 100% 821 82% 100%
Small World Hosts 1133 100% 1133 100% 100%
Routes 1114 90% 537 48% 66%
Both 1008 100% 1008 100% 100%
Experimental results comparing two-phase update (2PC) with our subset optimization (Subset). We
add or remove hosts and change routes to trigger configuration updates. The Ops column measures
the number of OpenFlow install operations used in each situation. The Subset portion of the table also
has an additional column (Ops %) that tabulates (Subset Ops = 2PC Ops). Overhead measures the
extra rules concurrently installed on a switch by our update mechanisms. We pessimistically present
the maximum of the overheads for all switches in the network – there may be many switches in the
network that never suﬀer that maximum overhead.
Table 5.2: Experimental results.
5.8 Implementation and Evaluation
We have built a system called Kinetic that implements the update abstractions introduced
in this chapter, and evaluated its performance on small but canonical example applications.
This section summarizes the key features of Kinetic and presents experimental results that
quantify the cost of implementing network updates in terms of the number of rules added
and deleted on each switch.
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Implementation overview Kinetic is a run-time system that sits on top of the NOX
OpenFlow controller [34]. The system comprises several Python classes for representing
network configurations and topologies, and a library of update mechanisms. The interface
to these mechanisms is through the per packet update and per flow update functions.
These functions take a new configuration and a network topology, and implement a transition
to the new configuration while providing the desired consistency level. Both functions are
currently based on the two-phase update mechanism, with the per flow update function us-
ing timeouts to track active flows. In addition to this basic mechanism, we have implemented
a number of optimized mechanisms that can be applied under certain conditions—e.g., when
the update only aﬀects a fraction of the network or network traﬃc. The runtime automat-
ically analyzes the new configuration and topology and applies these optimizations when
possible to reduce the cost of the update.
As described in Section 5.5, the two-phase update mechanism uses versioning to isolate
the old configuration and traﬃc from the updated configuration. Because Kinetic runs on
top of OpenFlow 1.0, we currently use the VLAN field to carry version tags (other options,
like MPLS labels, are available in newer versions of OpenFlow). Our algorithms analyze
the network topology to determine the ingress and internal ports and perform a two-phase
update.
Experiments To evaluate the performance of Kinetic, we developed a suite of experiments
using the Mininet [37] environment. Because Mininet does not oﬀer performance fidelity or
resource isolation between the simulated switches and the controller, we did not measure the
time needed to implement an update. However, as a proxy for elapsed time, we counted the
total number of install OpenFlow messages needed to implement each update, as well as the
number of extra rules (beyond the size of either the old or new configurations) installed on
120
a switch.
To evaluate per-packet consistency, we have implemented two canonical network applica-
tions: routing and multicast. The routing application computes the shortest paths between
each host in the topology and updates routes as hosts come online or go oﬄine and switches
are brought up and taken down for maintenance. The multicast application divides the hosts
evenly into two multicast groups and implements IP multicast along a spanning tree that
connects all of the hosts in a group. To evaluate the eﬀects of our optimizations, we ran both
applications on three diﬀerent topologies each containing 192 hosts and 48 switches in each
of three diﬀerent scenarios. The topologies were chosen to represent realistic and proposed
network topologies found in datacenters (fattree, small-world), enterprises (fattree) and a
random topology (waxman). The three scenarios can be divided up into:
1. Dynamic hosts and static routes
2. Static hosts and dynamic routes
3. Dynamic hosts and dynamic routes
In each scenario, we moved between 3 diﬀerent configurations, changing the network
in a well-prescribed manner. In the dynamic host scenario, we randomly selected between
10%   20% of the hosts and added or removed them from the network. In the dynamic
routes scenario, we randomly selected 20% of the routes in the network, and forced them to
re-route as if one of the switches in the route had been removed. For the multicast example,
we changed one of the multicast groups each time. Static means that we did not change the
host or routes.
To evaluate per-flow updates, we developed a load-balancing application that divides
traﬃc between two server replicas, using a hash computed from the client’s IP address.
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The update for this experiment involved bringing several new server replicas online and
re-balancing the load among all of the servers.
Results and analysis Table 5.2 compares the performance of the subset optimization to
a full two-phase update. Extension updates are not shown: whenever an extension update is
applicable, our subset mechanism performs the same update with the same overhead. The
two-phase update has high overhead in all scenarios.
We subject each application to a series of topology changes—adding and dropping hosts
and links—reflecting common network events that force the deployment of new network
configurations. We measure the number of OpenFlow operations required for the deployment
of the new configuration, as well as the overhead of installing extra rules to ensure per-packet
consistency. The overhead is the ratio of the number of extra rules installed during the per-
packet update of a switch divided by the (maximum) number of rules in the old or new
configuration. For example, if the old and new configurations both had 100 rules and during
the update the switch had 120 rules installed, that would be a 20% overhead. The Overhead
column in Table 5.2 presents the maximum overhead of all switches in the network. Two-
phase update requires approximately 100% overhead, because it leaves the old configuration
on the switch as it installs the new one. Because both configurations may not be precisely
the same size, it is not always exactly 100%. In some cases, the new configuration may be
much smaller than the old (for example, when routes are diverted away from a switch) and
the overhead is much lower than 100%.
The first routing scenario, where hosts are added or removed, demonstrates the potential
of our optimizations. When a new host comes online, the application computes routes
between it and every other online host. Because the rules for the new routes do not aﬀect
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traﬃc between existing hosts, they can be installed without modifying or reinstalling the
existing rules. Similarly, when a host goes oﬄine, only the installed rules routing traﬃc to
or from that host need to be uninstalled. This leads to update costs proportional to the
number of rules that changed between configurations, as opposed to a full two-phase update,
where the cost is proportional to the size of the entire new configuration.
Our optimizations yield fewer improvements for the multicast example, due to the nature
of the example: when the spanning tree changes, almost all paths change, triggering an
expensive update.
We have not applied our optimizations to the per-flow mechanism, therefore we do not
include an optimization evaluation of the load balancing application.
5.9 Conclusions and Future Work
Reasoning about concurrency is notoriously diﬃcult, and network software is no exception.
To make fundamental progress, the networking field needs simple, general, and reusable
abstractions for changing the configuration of the network. Our per-packet and per-flow
consistency abstractions allow programmers to focus their attention on the state of the
network before and after a configuration change, without worrying about the transition in
between. The update abstractions are powerful, in that the programmer does not need to
identify the properties that should hold during the transition, since any property common
to both configurations holds for any packet traversing the network during the update. This
enables lightweight verification techniques that simply verify the properties of the old and
new configurations. In addition, our abstractions are practical, in that eﬃcient and correct
update mechanisms exist and are implementable using today’s OpenFlow switches. Our
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implementation and Coq proofs are available at our website www.frenetic-lang.org.
In our ongoing work, we are exploring new mechanisms that make network updates
faster and cheaper, by limiting the number of rules or the number of switches aﬀected.
In this investigation, our theoretical model is a great asset, enabling us to prove that our
proposed optimizations are correct. We also plan to extend our formal model to capture
the per-flow consistent update abstraction, and prove the correctness of the per-flow update
mechanisms. In addition, we will make our update library available to the community, to
enable future OpenFlow applications to leverage these update abstractions. Finally, while
per-packet consistency and per-flow consistency are core abstractions with excellent semantic
properties, we want to explore other notions of consistency that either perform better (but
remain suﬃciently strong to provide benefits beyond eventual consistency) or provide even
richer guarantees.
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CHAPTER 6
RELATED WORK
6.1 General approaches
This thesis proposes a methodology for building reliable networking systems through verifi-
cation. This is not the first such proposal; see e.g.the survey paper [83]. Indeed, a system
called Formally Verifiable Networking by Wang et al. [104] proposed that network protocols
be designed and written in a specialized logic programming language called Network Datalog
(NDlog) which could then be formally analysed against a formal specification. This is similar
in spirit to the verification performed in Chapter 3, though the focus and design is diﬀerent.
NDlog was focused upon building distributed protocols on top of a clean-slate architecture
built upon Datalog. It also used the PVS theorem prover [81], which requires users to man-
ually construct proofs of correctness, unlike the fully automated decision procedure in this
thesis.
The approach taken in this thesis is to start with network programs written in domain-
specific, which are usually generated by a higher-level application written in a general purpose
programming language. By performing verification on the output, we essentially “cut oﬀ”
the need to reason about this higher-level application to assure correctness. An alternative
approach is to instead push the reasoning up the stack, and develop higher-level and more
expressive primitives for network programming to enable the programmer to reason directly
about the top-level program. NDlog is one example of this; another Datalog based language
is FlowLog [79],[78]. FlowLog provides a tierless programming model in which there is a
single unified abstraction shared between the control-plane, data-plane, and controller state.
In addition, FlowLog policies can be verified with the Alloy analyzer [43]. Alloy is not a
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complete procedure; it only performs bounded verification, but the authors of FlowLog found
that bounded verification suﬃced for almost all of their examples.
The Kinetic system [53]1 approaches the problem of building dynamic network systems
with a domain specific language based finite-state machines that react to network events,
and a temporal-logic based specification language that is used to analyze the correctness of
the finite-state machines.
Verdi, [106] is a system in a similar spirit to this thesis, but focused on the distributed
systems domain. Verdi is a formal framework for designing and implementing distributed
systems in the Coq theorem prover. It focuses reasoning about the behavior of systems under
diﬀerent failure models, and allows programmers to pick and choose which failure models to
adopt.
6.2 Formally verified systems
Verification technology has progressed dramatically in the past decades, making it feasible
to prove useful theorems about real systems including databases [66], compilers [58], and
even whole operating systems [54]. Compilers have been particularly fruitful targets for
verification eﬀorts [40]. Most prominently, the CompCert compiler translates programs in
a large subset of C to PowerPC, ARM, and x86 executables [58]. The Verified Software
Toolchain project provides machine-checked infrastructure for connecting properties obtained
by program analysis to guarantees at the machine level [5]. Rocksalt verifies a tool for
analyzing machine code against a detailed model of x86 [76]. Another system, Bedrock
provides rich Coq libraries for verifying low-level programs [17]. Significant portions of
1Note: the system in the paper Chapter 5 is based upon was also named Kinetic. There is no relation
between the two.
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many other compilers have been formalized and verified, including the llvm intermediate
representation [113], the F* typechecker [96], and an extension of CompCert with garbage
collection [68].
The seL4 microkernel [54] project built the first fully verified general purpose OS ker-
nel. They started with a formal specification of full functional correctness, written in Is-
abelle/HOL [80], built an executable specification (written in Haskell) that provably refined
the original specification, and finally built a high-performance implementation in C, which
in turn refined the Haskell specification. The final seL4 system achieved similar performance
to other L4 micro-kernels, but with a formal guarantee of correctness and reliability.
The CompCert project [58] is another celebrated fully formally verified system. Com-
pCert is a C compiler built in the Coq theorem prover and fully verified for correctness
against a formal model of C semantics and the semantics of the x86, ARM, and PowerPC
architectures. CompCert includes high-performance, fully verified compiler optimizations,
and achieves respectable performance against other, unverified compilers. In one study of
compiler bugs, every compiler except the verified CompCert compiler was found to have con-
tain bugs that caused wrong code generation [108]2. Before CompCert, the so-called “CLInc
stack” [11] was a formally verified system consisting of a high-level programming language
with a verification engine (Gypsy [32]); a verified compiler for a restricted language [109];
a verified assembler (Piton [75]); a verified multitasking operating system (Kit[10]); and a
fully verified microprocessor (the FM8502 [42]).
In a diﬀerent vein, there have been several projects that built formal models of networks
or network protocols (see e.g.[71] [107]). One of the most detailed formal networking models
2They initially found a bug in an unverified component of CompCert. In response to the bug, the project
extended the verification to include that component, and the authors were no longer able to find any bugs
in the compiler.
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ever built is Bishop et al.’s model of the TCP protocol and the Sockets API[13]. They built
a fully formal, highly precise model of the TCP protocol and its associated Sockets API in
HOL4 [33], and exhaustively validated it against de facto reference implementations.
A portion of the pane [21] compiler was formalized in Coq, but since the proof did not
model several subtleties of flow tables, the compiler still had bugs. Unlike our system, pane
does not model or verify any portion of its run-time system. We used some of the pane
proofs during early development of our system.
6.3 Network verification tools
Specification languages Before SDN, abstract network specifications independent from
implementation were largely limited to firewall policies. See, e.g. [7] for an entity-relationship
modeling framework for specifying security policies. One particularly notable early work in
this area was Guttman’s filtering postures [36], which took a global network access control
policy and automatically specialized it into local filters whose combination was guaranteed
to enforce the global policy.
More recently, the VeriFlow [52] network verification system includes a general API for
checking application-specific network invariants. This API is not exactly a specification
language (it lacks semantics), and it’s not exactly clear what properties it can and can not
express. Invariants must be checkable in a sort of incremental manner, where only modified
equivalence classes of network rules are given at each step.
The NetPlumber [48] system includes a specification language for relating network flows
to allowable paths. This language is based upon regular expressions with wildcards, and
is quite similar in spirit to the Pathetic language in this chapter. However, the languages
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are subtly diﬀerent: whereas Pathetic is based on regular expressions in the sense of formal
language theory, and comes with a formal semantics, NetPlumber’s language is based on
regular expressions in the sense of the string matching functions found in many programming
languages. Arguably, the latter design decision makes them easier to understand and more
familiar to the average programmer. They also lack a semantics, making it diﬃcult or
impossible for a programmer to reason about the exact meaning of their specification.
ConfigChecker [3] is a system for analyzing firewall and router configurations. It uses
specifications of network behavior specified in Computational Tree Logic (CTL), a branching-
time temporal logic.
Network verifiers/static analyzers One of the first static analyzers to achieve widespread
adoption was Feamster and Balakrishnan’s routing configuration checker rcc[20]. rcc was a
tool that statically analyzed Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) router configurations for com-
mon configuration mistakes such as typos, learning unusable paths, sharing unusable paths,
or failing to learn all usable paths. rcc was reportedly widely welcomed in industry as an im-
provement over the status quo of running configurations in small test-beds and then pushing
them out to production to detect bugs. rcc was limited to detecting generic configuration
faults, and was not able to verify full application specific functional correctness.
Recent years have seen an incredible interest in the development of verification tools
for the networking domain, largely focused around SDN. Xie et al. introduced techniques
for statically analyzing the reachability properties of networks [107]. Some prominent recent
domain specific verification engines include: Header Space Analysis [49] and NetPlumber [48],
which introduced the idea of including location in the packet metadata, uniformizing packet
transformations and topology and Veriflow [52], which functions as a real-time invariant
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checker sitting between a controller and the network. Zhang and Malik [112] build a SAT-
based verification framework that uses a similar network model to Header Space Analysis,
but generalizes the model to allow uniform specification of correctness requirements3. Unlike
the system described in Chapter 3, these tools work at several levels below the programmer,
making it diﬃcult to relate the results of verification back to the actual code. For example,
if one of these verifiers says that a rule that was just inserted into the network breaks
reachability, the programmer would have to determine why that rule was added by walking
back through the controller that installed the rule, to the compiler that output the rules to
be installed, and connect that back to the input policy, which itself was generated by another
piece of code.
The model developed by Kazemian et. al [49] was the starting point for the network model
in Chapter 5. Since their model only spoke of a single, static configuration, we extended the
network semantics to include updates so we could model a network changing dynamically
over time. In addition, while their model was used to help describe their algorithms, ours
was used to help us state and prove various correctness properties of our system.
Finally, Foster et al. [25] present an equivalence checker for NetKAT based on very similar
foundations as the one in this chapter. The system in this chapter was based on a rewrite
of the code base in that paper, and shares a similar architecture and overall bisimulation
algorithm. For more specific details on the diﬀerence between that paper and this one, see
Section 3.6.
3Header Space Analysis required ad-hoc extensions of the model to support certain properties. For
example, to detect forwarding loops, they extended the packet header to include a list of all visited ports
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6.3.1 Network debugging
The NICE model checker [14] is a state-space exploration engine that can detect bugs in
a full OpenFlow system: switches, controller, and control application. NICE searches for
generic network bugs such as forwarding loops or black-holes, and allows the user to program
application specific invariants to test. The system uses domain specific exploration strategies
to reduce the complexity of the state space and find bugs more quickly. Portions of the
Featherweight OpenFlow model in Chapter 4 are inspired by the bugs discovered in nice.
Sethi et al. [90] extend the bounded verification approach of NICE to arbitrarily large
numbers of packets with the use of application specific non-interference lemmas. The Kuai
system [65] further scaled the model checking approach to much larger topologies, and au-
tomatically deals with unbounded sets of packets without the need for manual lemmas4
A number of projects have focused upon easing the diﬃculty of debugging network control
and dataplanes by extending models of software debuggers to networks as in NDB [38]; auto-
matically generating test packets to detect bugs in data planes [110]; or analyzing snapshots
of network state with a SAT solver to detect failures in the dataplane [64].
6.3.2 Network verification
VeriCon [6] is a system that verifies the correctness of an SDN program for all topologies
with a specific property, and all possible network inputs. Based upon Z3 [18], VeriCon
specifies desired network behavior and acceptable topologies in first-order logic, rather than
a networking specific language. Unlike most of the other systems here, they assume in-order,
4As an interesting coincidence, Kuai is built upon the PReach distributed model checker [12], which the
author helped build in between undergrad and graduate school.
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atomic installation of switch rules, an assumption that can be enforced in practice, but only
with a high performance penalty.
The verification tool in Chapter 3 was originally based upon the NetKAT verifier in [25].
The diﬀerences between that tool and the one in this thesis are outlined in detail in the
relevant chapter. Stewart [94] built a formal verification system for NetCore (a predecessor
to NetKAT) based upon Hoare triples in Coq, and proved the verification tool itself correct
with respect to a formal model of NetCore based upon the semantics in Chapter 4.
In a diﬀerent vein, Dobrescu and Argyraki verify the correctness network dataplanes
implemented in the Click software router framework [55]. They use symbolic execution to
prove properties of software dataplanes that are routinely verified for hardware dataplanes
such as crash-freedom or bounded execution.
6.4 Network updates
Updating networks without introducing undesired behavior has long been recognized as an
important and diﬃcult problem. Because of the great complexity of networks, even solutions
that avoid problems in one protocol level can inadvertently introduce undesired behavior in
another, nominally independent, protocol (see especially [99] for a surprising example of this
interplay between IGP and BGP). Before the rise of SDN, most approaches focused upon
manipulating the inputs to distributed routing protocols so that they would converge to
desired configurations without transitioning through “bad states”. A full overview of this
area would be beyond the scope of this chapter, but a representative sampling can be found
through these topics: performing network maintenance without disruption [91] [51] [28],
handling topology changes [77] [92] [29], routing protocol migration [50] [102] [100], avoiding
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disruptions during traﬃc engineering [26] [27], general techniques for avoiding introducing
forwarding loops [30] [93], and general frameworks for updating distributed networking pro-
tocols [16] [84]. For a more thorough exploration of the area, see e.g. Vanbever’s thesis
[101].
Consensus Routing [45] seeks to eliminate transient errors, such as disconnectivity, that
arise during BGP updates. In particular, Consensus Routing’s “stable mode” is similar to
our per-packet consistency, though computed in a distributed manner for BGP routes. On
the other hand, Consensus Routing only applies to a single protocol (BGP), whereas our
work may benefit any protocol or application developed in our framework. The BGP-LP
mechanism from [46] is essentially per-packet consistency for BGP.
The dynamic software update problem is related to network update consistency. The
problem of upgrading software in a general distributed system is addressed in [2]. The scope
of that work diﬀers in that the nodes being updated are general purpose computers, not
switches, running general software.
The related problem of maintaining safety while updating firewall configurations has been
addressed by Zhang et. al [111]. That work formalized a definition of safety similar in spirit
to per-packet consistency, but limited to a single device.
6.4.1 Alternative abstractions
Since the original publication of the per-packet and per-flow consistency abstractions, there
has been a large body of work proposing new abstractions and new mechanisms.
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Customizable properties One such abstraction preserves specific, application specific
properties through a general update specialization procedure. Instead preserving all pos-
sible trace properties as in per-packet consistency, a programmer can specify exactly the
properties they want preserved, and achieve a faster update. The Dionysus system [44] dy-
namically schedules updates based upon the exact properties to be preserved, as well as the
performance characteristics of the switches themselves5. However, Dionysus requires a rule
dependency calculation that is specific to the general property being preserved, and thus can
be automatically applied to diﬀerent properties. The network synthesis approach [67] views
network updates as a distributed programming problem and uses techniques from program
synthesis to construct minimal update sequences that preserve desired network invariants
specified in temporal logic. Similarly, the Customizeable Consistency Generator [115] anal-
yses the desired invariant and synthesizes a update sequence that satisfies it, or resorts to
the consistent update mechanisms outlined in Chapter 5 when no such sequence exists.
Alternative properties Consistent updates are guaranteed to preserve all trace proper-
ties, but not all network properties are trace properties. For example, guarantees about con-
gestion, bandwidth or latency are not preserved by consistent updates. The Software-driven
Wide Area Network (SWAN) [41] system used SDN to optimzie the network utilization of
expensive WAN links. SWAN analyzed the problem of a congestion-free update: given a
congestion-free network state with known loads and link capacities, compute a sequence of
network updates that lead to target congestion-free state such that none of the intermediate
states introduce congestion. They show that, in general, no such update may exist, but if
x% of “scratch capacity” is left on each link, then an update sequence can be found of length
at most d 1
x
e  1. Similarly, the zUpdate [59] system provides an abstraction that guarantees
5Dionysus found that update times can vary dramatically between diﬀerent switches. By dynamically ad-
justing its update schedule to the observed performance of the switches, they were able to achieve significant
increases in update performance
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a congestion-free, lossless network update.
Per-flow consistency generalizes per-packet consistency by preserving properties on re-
lated packets within a single flow. Inter-flow consistency [60] generalizes per-flow consis-
tency by preserving constraints between diﬀerent flows. For example, inter-flow consistency
can guarantee that two specific flows are never colocated on the same link (e.g.for fault-
tolerance), or that related flows in diﬀerent directions (e.g.the two flows of a single TCP
connection) are treated in a consistent manner.
6.4.2 Optimized update mechanisms
The update mechanisms described in this thesis may require high-switch rulespace overhead,
or long convergence time. A number of optimizations that explore diﬀerent tradeoﬀs in time
and space have been proposed. If an update is split into several incremental updates, then
the maximum rulespace overhead required can be greatly reduced [47]. Similarly, Luo et
al. observe that by carefully exploiting OpenFlow wildcard rules, rules common to both the
old and new configuration can be left on the switch [62]. This optimization is related to
the subspace update outlined in Chapter 5, and if combined with that analysis can lead to
highly compact updates. ESPRES [82] is an update scheduler, similar in spirit to Dionysus,
that reorders, rate-limits, and prioritizes updates to avoid overloading the limited control
plane bandwidth found in early generation OpenFlow switches. McGeer [69] describes an
algorithm that completely removes the overhead of two-phase update by trading oﬀ the time
required for the update and possibly introducing latency to packets traveling through the
network during update.
The per-flow mechanisms described in this thesis assume that all packets in a single
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flow arrive at the same ingress switch. Afek et al. describe a mechanism [1] that removes
this restriction. Similarly, Zhao et al. [114] use an optimization approach to minimize the
overhead and management required to preserve per-flow consistency using the flow binning
scheme. Liu et al. [61] provide a heuristic algorithm to solve the per-flow optimization
problem.
In a diﬀerent and novel approach, Mizrahi and Moses [72] propose using precisely synchro-
nized network clocks to schedule and perform network updates with minimal inconsistency
windows.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS
“A distributed system is one in which the failure of a computer you didn’t even know existed
can render your own computer unusable.” —Leslie Lamport
To someone who’s never built or maintained one, a computer network must seem like
the simplest of objects. You draw a network diagram, starting with the nodes you want
to communicate, draw a graph fully connecting them, and then you go build it. And in
fact, if the only function of your network is connectivity, it is not much more conceptually
diﬃcult than that1. Unfortunately, most computer networks have requirements beyond sim-
ple connectivity. Consider a pre-paid wireless network, such as the ones commonly found
in airports or onboard airplanes. The network must provide full connectivity to paid sub-
scribers, limited connectivity to unpaid users, enable new users to create accounts, track and
bill traﬃc usage (but not traﬃc used for creating/checking accounts!), throttle or restrict
traﬃc for users when their subscription ends, and protect users from one another. And it’s
not enough just to build the network: maintaining and operating it introduces a whole set
of operational requirements such as active monitoring to detect failures, logging to debug
connectivity problems, and fine-grained geographic tracking for analytics2, just to name a
few. All of these diﬀerent requirements are traditionally implemented with their own set of
protocols and mechanisms, many of which, by necessity, overlap and interact in complicated
ways.
1Even in this case, things can quickly become complicated: which connected graph should be chosen?
Should wired or wireless links be used? What happens when a link or node fails? How do you add new
nodes to the network? What addressing scheme should you use? What nodes need to be able to broadcast
to each other?
2Which access points are overutilized? Underutilized? How does utilization vary with time of day? ad
infinitum
137
And yet, at its core, a network truly is a simple object. Almost all network functionality
boils down to looking at a packet and deciding how to modify it and where to forward it. The
techniques, languages, and tools presented in this thesis attack the complexity of networking
by distilling it down to this simple core.
We began by describing a specification language that describes the desired flow of packets
through a network at a high-level of abstraction, but still admits automatic verification of
correct implementations. We then showed how to compile network programs into the low-
level language of switches in a provably correct way that preserves the original verification
promises. Finally, we showed how focusing on the behavior of a single packet through the
network leads to a correctness criteria for network updates that provides strong reasoning
guarantees about network behavior, even while it is in flux.
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS
A.1 Proofs for Chapter 3
We first prove a lemma characterizing the translation of path expressions:
Lemma 5 (Equivalence of Path expression translation). For every path expression P , G(P)
= G(LPM)
Proof. Proof by structural induction on the Pathetic path expression policy P .
Case 
G() = f j  2 Atg
= G(1)
= G(LM)
Case ;
G(;) = ;
= G(0)
= G(LM)
Case S
G(S) = fdup j  2 At;  = [S=sw ]g
= G(sw  S  dup)
= G(LSM)
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Case ?
G(?) = fdup j  2 At;  = [S=sw ]; S 2 Swg
= G(
X
S2Sw
sw  S  dup)
= G(L?M)
Case P
G(P) = At  P  (dup  P ) nG(P)
= At  P  (dup  P ) nG(LPM) By the induction hypothesis
= G(LPM)
= G(LPM)
Case P :P 0
G(P :P 0) = G(P) G(P 0)
= G(LPM) G(LP 0M) By the induction hypothesis
= G(LPM  LP 0M)
= G(LP :P 0M)
Case P jP 0
G(P jP 0) = G(P) [G(P 0)
= G(LPM) [G(LP 0M) By the induction hypothesis
= G(LPM+ LP 0M)
= G(LP jP 0M)
Case P \ P 0
G(P \ P 0) = G(P) \G(P 0)
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= G(LPM) \G(LP 0M) By the induction hypothesis
= G(LPM \ LP 0M)
= G(LP \ P 0M)
Case P
G(P) =
[
i0
G(P)i
=
[
i0
G(LPM)i By the induction hypothesis
= G(LPM)
= G(LPM)
Theorem 13 (Theorem 1). For every Pathetic program , G() = G(LM)
Proof. Proof by induction on .
Case a) P
G(a) P) = G(a) G(P)
= G(a) G(LPM) By Lemma 5
= G(a  LPM)
= G(La) PM)
Case  ] 0 Immediate by induction and definition of L ] 0M.
Case  C 0 Immediate by induction and definition of L C 0M.
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Theorem 14 (Theorem 2). p   iﬀ LM \ p  0.
Proof.
p   () G(p)  G()
() G(p) \G() = ;
() G(p) \G() = ;
() G(p) \G(LM) = ;
() G(p \G(LM)) = ;
() G(p \G(LM)) = G(0)
() p \G(LM)  0
Corollary 3 (Corollary 1). p   iﬀ p  LM.
Theorem 15 (NetKAT( ;\) is a conservative extension of NetKAT). For every complement
and intersection-free policy p, JpK = JpKNK, where JKNK is the original NetKAT semantics.
Proof. Immediate by induction upon p.
Theorem 16 (Theorem 3). For all dup-free policies p and q, if p  q is provable by the
NetKAT( ;\) axioms, then JpK dup = JqK dup.
Proof. Proof by structural induction on the derivation of p  q with a case analysis on the
last rule used. Soundness of the NetKAT axioms follows from Theorem 15.
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The soundness of the axioms inter-*, par-inter-dist, comp-par, and comp-inter
follow trivially from the semantics and basic properties of union/intersection.
inter-mod-dist-left
Jf  n  (p \ q)K dup pk = (Jf  nK dup  Jp \ qK dup) pk
=
[
pk02Jf nK dup pk
Jp \ qK dup pk0
=
[
pk02fpk[n=f ]g
Jp \ qK dup pk0
= Jp \ qK dup pk[n=f ]
= JpK dup pk[n=f ] \ JqK dup pk[n=f ]
= Jf  n  pK dup pk \ Jf  n  qK dup pk
= J(f  n  p) \ (f  n  q)K dup pk
comp-filter
Jf = nK dup pk = PK n Jf = nK dup pk
= PK n fpk j pk[f ] = ng
Reasoning by cases:
If pk(f ) 6= n
J:f = n P K pk = PK
If pk(f ) = n
J:f = n P K pk = ; and JPP 6=   K = PK n fpkg.
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comp-mod
JX

X
 6=[f n]
  K pk = [
; 6=[f n]
J  K pk
=
[
 6=[f n]
JK pk For the unique  such that ()
= PK n fpk[f =n]g
= Jf  nK pk
comp-seq
Jp  qK dup pk = Jp  qK dup pk
=
[
pk02JpK dup pk
JqK dup pk0
=
\
pk02JpK dup pk
JqK dup pk0
=
\
pk02JpK dup pk
JqK dup pk0
=
\
pk0
([pk0 =2 JpK dup pk]  all [ JqK dup pk0)
=
\
pk0

[pk0 2 JpK dup pk]  all [ JqK dup pk0
=
\
pk0
([pk0 2 JpK dup pk]  all [ JqK dup pk0)
=
\
pk0
(Jp  pk0  allK dup pk [ JqK dup pk0)
=
\
pk0
(Jp  pk0  allK dup pk [ Jpk0  qK dup pk)
=
\
pk0
(Jp  pk0  all+ pk0  qK dup pk)
= J\
pk0
p  pk0  all+ pk0  qK dup pk
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Theorem 17 (Theorem 4). For all policies p and q, if
p  q
in the equational theory generated by the NetKAT( ;\) axioms minus comp-filter, comp-
mod, and comp-seq, then
JpK = JqK
Proof. Proof by structural induction on the derivation of p  q with a case analysis on the
last rule used. Soundness of the NetKAT axioms follows from Theorem 15.
The soundness of the axioms inter-* and par-inter-dist follow trivially from the
semantics and basic properties of union/intersection. This leaves only the axiom inter-
mod-dist-left.
Jf  n  (p \ q)K pk::h = (Jf  nK  Jp \ qK) pk::h
=
[
pk0::h02Jf nK pk::hJp \ qK pk0::h0
=
[
pk0::h02fpk[n=f ]::hg
Jp \ qK pk0::h0
= Jp \ qK pk[n=f ]::h
= JpK pk[n=f ]::h \ JqK pk[n=f ]::h
= Jf  n  pK pk::h \ Jf  n  qK pk::h
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= J(f  n  p) \ (f  n  q)K pk::h
A.1.1 Completeness
To prove completeness of the dup-free NetKAT( ;\) axioms, we show that every dup-free
NetKAT( ;\) term is provably equivalent to a dup-free NetKAT term, and then appeal to
the completeness of the NetKAT axioms. To make the induction work, we actually show a
stronger theorem: every dup-free NetKAT( ;\) term is provably equivalent to a dup-free,-
free reduced NetKAT term.
Lemma 6. (
P
i i  i) \ (
P
j 
0
j  0j) 
P
k k  k such that 8k9i; j s.t. k = i = 0j and
k = i = 
0
j.
Lemma 7.     (P0 6=P0 0  0) +P0P0 6= 0  0 is provable.
Lemma 8. Every dup-free NetKAT( ;\) policy is provably equivalent to a sum of reduced
-free,dup-free NetKAT policies.
Proof. Proof by structural induction upon the policy p, with a case analysis on the last
syntax rule.
Because the NetKAT( ;\) axioms are a conservative extension of the NetKAT axioms,
all cases except p\q,p, and p follow immediately from the induction hypothesis and fact that
every dup-free NetKAT policy is provably equivalent to a sum of dup-free reduced NetKAT
policies (Lemma 9 in [4]).
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Case p \ q By the induction hypothesis, p Pi i  i, and q Pj 0j  0j. By Lemma 6,
this is provably equal to a term
P
k k  k, which is in the form desired.
Case p By the induction hypothesis, p Pi i  i.
p 
X
i
i  i

Y
i
i  i By comp-par

Y
i
 X
j
i;j  i;j
!
By Lemma 7

X
k
0k  0k For some 0k; 0k by inter-par-dist and induction
Case p By the induction hypothesis, p  Pi i  i. Thus, p  (Pi i  i), which is a
dup-free NetKAT term. By a theorem of NetKAT (Lemma 9 in [4]), every dup-free
NetKAT term is provably equivalent to a dup-free, -free reduced NetKAT term.
Theorem 18 (Theorem 5). The axioms for NetKAT( ;\) shown in Figure 3.9 plus the
NetKAT axioms (minus pa-dup-filter-comm) are complete for the dup-free fragment.
Proof. Follows directly from Lemma 8 and the proof of NetKAT completeness (Theorem 2
in [4]).
A.1.2 NetKAT( ;\) Derivatives
Lemma 9 (). E;(p)  E(p)()()
Proof. Proof by structural induction upon the term p.
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Case 
E;() = [ = ]
 [   = ]
 E()()
 E()()()
Case b
E;(b) = [ =   b]
 Eb()()
 E(b)()()
Case p+ q
E;(p+ q) = E;(p) + E;(q)
 E(p)()() + E(q)()()
 E(p) + E(q)()()
 E(p+ q)()()
Case p \ q
E;(p \ q) = E;(p)  E;(q)
 E(p)()()  E(q)()()
 E(p) \ E(q)()()
 E(p \ q)()()
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Case p  q
E;(p  q) =
X

E;(p)  E;(q)

X

E(p)()()  E(q)()()
 E(p)  E(q)()()
 E(p  q)()()
Case p
E;(p) = E;(p)
 E(p)()()
 E(p)()()
 E(p)()()
Case p
E;(p
) = [ = ] +
X

E;(p)  E;(p)
 [ = ] +
X

E(p)()()  E(p)()()
 E(p)()()
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Lemma 10.
D0;(p) 
X
(e;d)2D(p)
[e()()]  d
Proof. Proof by structural induction upon the term p.
Case p = f  n In this case, D(p) is the empty set, which is equivalent to D0(f  n) = 0.
Case p = a In this case, D(p) is the empty set, which is equivalent to D0(a) = 0.
Case p = dup
D0(dup) = [ = ]
 E1()()
 E1()()  1

X
(e;d)2f(E(1);1)g
[e()()]  d

X
(e;d)2D(dup)
[e()()]  d
Case p = e1 + e2
D0(e1 + e2) = D
0
(e1) +D
0
(e2)

0@ X
(e;d)2D(e1)
[e()()]  d
1A+
0@ X
(e;d)2D(e2)
[e()()]  d
1A By induction

X
(e;d)2D(e1)[D(e2)
[e()()]  d

X
(e;d)2D(p)
[e()()]  d
Case p = q  r
D0(e1  e2) = D0(e1)  e2 +
P

E(e1) D0(e2)
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
0@ X
(e;d)2D(e1)
[e()()]  d
1A  e2 +P

E(e1) 
0@ X
(e0;d0)2D(e2)
[e0()()]  d0
1A
By induction

0@ X
(e;d)2D(e1)
[e()()]  d
1A  e2 +P

E(e1)()() 
0@ X
(e0;d0)2D(e2)
[e0()()]  d0
1A
By Lemma 9

0@ X
(e;d)2D(e1)
[e()()]  d
1A  e2 +P

0@ X
(e0;d0)2D(e2)
E(e1)()()  [e0()()]  d0
1A

0@ X
(e;d)2D(e1)
[e()()]  d
1A  e2 +
0@ X
(e0;d0)2D(e2)
P

E(e1)()()  [e0()()]  d0
1A

0@ X
(e;d)2D(e1)
[e()()]  d
1A  e2 +
0@ X
(e0;d0)2D(e2)
[(E(e1)  e0)()()]  d0
1A

0@ X
(e;d)2D(e1)e2
[e()()]  d
1A+
0@ X
(e0;d0)2E(e1)D(e2)
[e0()()]  d0
1A

X
(e;d)2D(e1)e2[E(e1)D(e2)
[e()()]  d

X
(e;d)2D(p)
[e()()]  d
Case p = q \ r
D0(q \ r) = D0(q) \D0(r)

0@ X
(e1;d1)2D(q)
[e1()()]  d1
1A \
0@ X
(e2;d2)2D(r)
[e2()()]  d2
1A
By induction

X
(e1;d1)2D(q);(e2;d2)2D(r)
([e1()()]  d1) \ ([e2()()]  d2)
By par-inter-dist
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
X
(e1;d1)2D(q);(e2;d2)2D(r)
([e1()()] \ [e2()()])  (d1 \ d2)
By inter-filter-dist-left

X
(e1;d1)2D(q);(e2;d2)2D(r)
([e1()()] \ [e2()()])  d1 \ d2
By inter-filter-dist-left

X
(e1;d1)2D(q);(e2;d2)2D(r)
([e1()()] \ [e2()()])  (d1 \ d2)
By inter-idem

X
(e;d)2f(e1;d1)\(e2;d2)j(e1;d1)2D(q);(e2;d2)2D(r)g
[e()()]  d

X
(e;d)2D(p\q)
[e()()]  d
Case p = q
D0(q
) 
X

E;(q
) D0;(q)  q

X

E;(q
) 
0@ X
(e;d)2D(q)
[e()()]  d
1A q

X

E;(q
) 
0@ X
(e;d)2D(q)
[e()()]  d  q
1A

X

X
(e;d)2D(q)
E;(q
)  [e()()]  d  q

X

X
(e;d)2D(q)
E(q)()()  [e()()]  d  q

X
(e;d)2D(q)
[(E(q)  e)()()]  d  q

X
(e;d)2D(q)
E(q)  [e()()]  d  q
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
X
(e;d)2D(q)
[e()()]  d
Case p = q
D0(q) = D
0
(q)

X
(e;d)2D(q)
[e()()]  d

Y
(e;d)2D(q)
[e()()]  d

Y
(e;d)2D(q) s.t. e()()
d

X
(e;d)2D(q)
[e()()]  d
Lemma 11 (Lemma 2).
D;(p) 
X
(e;d)2D(p)
[e()()]    d
Proof. Follows directly from previous lemma.
NetKAT( ;\) spines To prove that our equivalence checking algorithm terminates, we
need to show that there is some finite bound upon the state space of our automata. In the
original NetKAT paper, this was shown by demonstrating a finite basis for the state space,
called spines. We extend their spine construction to NetKAT( ;\), and use this extension
to show that the set of derivatives of a term is finite, identifying terms up to associativity,
commutativity, and idempotency (ACI) of intersection. Unlike NetKAT spines, extended
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NetKAT( ;\) extended spines
espine(a) , ;
espine(f  n) , ;
espine(p+ q) , espine(p) [ espine(q)
espine(p  q) , fe  q j e 2 espine(p)g [ espine(q)
espine(p) , fe  p j e 2 espine(p)g
espine(dup) , f1g
espine(p \ q) , fp0 \ q0 j p0 2 espine(p) ^ q0 2 espine(q)g
espine(p) , \(fq j q 2 espine(p))
spines are not proper subterms of the original term. In fact, the size of the set of extended
spines of a term is non-elementary in the size of the original term. Because FDDs are a
specific representation of the state space, finiteness of spines implies finiteness of FDD based
automata, modulo semantic equivalence of FDDs.
The definition of extended spines (shown in Appendix A.1.2) is not quite as elegant as
the original spine definition. NetKAT spines were able to succinctly identify terms up to
ACI of + by using a set representation. Because we work with two distinct ACI operations
(+ and \), a single layer of sets does not suﬃce. Instead, we use sets to capture ACI of +
(as in the original spines), and implicitly work with intersections up to ACI. In the actual
implementation, this is also implemented using a set representation.
In particular, we work with the intersection closure of a finite set of terms up to ACI.
To make this precise, we can uniquely define the intersection closure of a set S (\(S))
by taking the powerset of the set of terms, and then sorting each subset and taking the
formal intersection of each. But this level of formality is not necessary to understand the
development.
Theorem 19. 8(e; d) 2 D(p); d 2 espine(p)
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Proof. Proof by structural induction upon p.
Case 
D() = ;
= espine()
Case b
D(b) = ;
= espine(b)
Case dup
D(dup) = f(E(1); 1)g
f1g = espine(dup)
Case p+ q
D(p+ q) = D(p) [D(q)
espine(p+ q) = espine(p) [ espine(q)
The case follows by induction.
Case p \ q
D(p \ q) = fd1 \ d2 j d1 2 D(p); d2 2 D(q)g
espine(p \ q) = fe1 \ e2 j e1 2 espine(p); e2 2 espine(q)g
The case follows by induction.
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Case p  q
D(p  q) = fd  q j d 2 D(p)g [ E(p) D(q)
espine(p  q) = fe  q j e 2 espine(p)g [ espine(q)
The case follows by induction.
Case p
D(p) = fd  p j d 2 D(p)g
espine(p) = fe  p j e 2 espine(p)g
The case follows by induction.
Case p
D(p) =
[
;
8<:(E(  p); \
(e0;d0)2D(p)^e0()()
d0)
9=;
espine(p) = \(fq j q 2 espine(p))
The case follows by induction.
A.2 Proofs for Chapter 4
The theorems of this chapter have been formally verified in the Coq theorem prover. We
include the proof text in the thesis supplement. All proofs have been completed in Coq
version 8.4.
The Coq proofs for this chapter were jointly developed with Arjun Guha. The compiler
was based on a system originally built by Arjun Guha and Andrew D. Ferguson.
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A.3 Proofs for Chapter 5
The theorems of this chapter have been formally verified in the Coq theorem prover. We
include the proof text in the thesis supplement. All proofs have been completed in Coq
version 8.4.
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